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Articles 
The Wires Go to War: The U.S. Experiment with 
Government Ownership of the Telephone System 
During World War I 
Michael A. Janson* & Christopher S. Yoo** 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of the U.S. telephone system is 
that it has always been privately owned, in stark contrast to the pattern of 
government ownership followed by virtually every other nation.  What is not 
widely known is how close the United States came to falling in line with the rest 
of the world.  For the one-year period following July 31, 1918, the exigencies of 
World War I led the federal government to take over the U.S. telephone system.  
A close examination of this episode sheds new light into a number of current 
policy issues.  The history confirms that natural monopoly was not solely 
responsible for AT&T’s return to dominance and reveals that the Kingsbury 
Commitment was more effective in deterring monopoly than generally believed.  
Instead, a significant force driving the re-monopolization of the telephone system 
was the U.S. Postmaster General, Albert Burleson—not Theodore Vail, 
President of AT&T.  It also demonstrates that universal service was the result of 
government-imposed emulation of the postal system, not, as some have claimed, 
a post hoc rationalization for maintaining monopoly.  The most remarkable 
question is, having once obtained control over the telephone system, why did the 
federal government ever let it go?  The dynamics surrounding this decision 
reveal the inherent limits of relying on war to justify extraordinary actions.  
More importantly, it shows the difficulties that governments face in overseeing 
industries that are undergoing dynamic technological change and that require 
significant capital investments. 
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Introduction 
One of the characteristics of the U.S. telephone system generally 
thought to distinguish it from all others is that it has always been privately 
owned.  In all other major countries, telephone systems have generally been 
owned and operated by the government, most commonly through an 
organization known as a Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT).1  The United 
States took a notably different course, having private ownership of telephone 
and telegraph systems.2  Indeed, the American emphasis on individualism 
 
1. Philip J. Weiser, The Ghost of Telecommunications Past, 103 MICH. L. REV. 101, 103 (2005) 
(reviewing PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATION (2004)). 
2. See ROBERT MILLWARD, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE 245 (2005) 
(“[P]ublic ownership by a single enterprise of a national network was the rule by 1950 and 
reflected, in part, the unwillingness of governments . . . to use arm’s-length regulation of private 
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and lack of a legacy of strong sovereign states has led some to regard 
government ownership of the telephone in the United States as unthinkable.3  
The wave of privatizations that began worldwide in the 1980s is widely 
regarded as an implicit endorsement of the American approach.4 
What is not widely known is how close the United States came to 
falling in line with the rest of the world.  For the roughly one-year period 
following July 31, 1918, the federal government took over the U.S. telephone 
system.5  This period of history is important for many reasons.  It provides a 
fascinating insight into the dynamics of institutional change, particularly 
regarding the role of individuals, political processes, and technology. 
The episode also sheds light on many central issues of 
telecommunications policy today.  For example, the analysis reveals that the 
reassertion of the Bell System’s monopoly, long blamed on natural 
monopoly,6 or the Antitrust Division’s failure to curb the ambitions of AT&T 
President Theodore Vail,7 was assisted and encouraged by the deliberate 
policies of the Postmaster General to consolidate the industry.8  Moreover, 
the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 may have been more effective at 
preventing consolidation than generally realized.9  Further, contrary to the 
criticism that universal service was a concept that arose during the 1960s to 
rationalize the Bell monopoly after the fact,10 history reveals that universal 
service has its roots during the government takeover, much earlier than 
previously thought.11  The episode marked a nascent revolution in federal–
state relations that would ultimately collapse due to the unpopularity of rate 
increases.12  Perhaps most revealing is the government’s surprising decision, 
after having taken over the telephone system, to once again return it to 
 
monopolies . . . .”); RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, POSTAL ENTERPRISE: POST OFFICE INNOVATIONS 
WITH CONGRESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS, 1789–1970, at 51 (2000), available at 
http://www.prc.gov/prc-docs/library/refdesk/techpapers/Kielbowicz/enterprise.pdf (“Except for the 
United States, virtually every nation regarded the telegraph and telephone as natural extensions of 
the state’s mail monopoly and operated them under a postal ministry.”). 
3. ALAN STONE, PUBLIC SERVICE LIBERALISM: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSITIONS IN 
PUBLIC POLICY 42 (1991). 
4. See Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the 
Telecommunications Sector Around the World, 47 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395–96 (2004) (documenting 
the dramatic increase in privately owned telephone systems during the 1980s and 1990s and 
showing that privatization improved industry performance). 
5. Comment, The Telegraph Industry: Monopoly or Competition, 51 YALE L.J. 629, 633 (1942). 
6. See GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 107 (1987) (“Indeed, until the late 1960s few questioned that the telephone industry 
was a natural monopoly.”); PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATION LAW 
§ 2.1.2, at 86 (2d ed. 1999) (“Is the telephone industry (or any part of it) a natural monopoly?  Until 
the 1960s, the answer was generally presumed to be yes, from end to end.”). 
7. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 56 (2010). 
8. See infra section II(B)(1). 
9. See infra section III(A)(2). 
10. MILTON L. MUELLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE 6, 150–64 (1997). 
11. See infra subpart III(B). 
12. See infra subpart III(C). 
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private control.13  The government’s reasons for doing so are quite revealing 
about the realities of management and ownership in an industry characterized 
by dynamic technological change. 
Despite the importance of this episode in history, it has been largely 
overlooked by the scholarly community.  Many histories discussing the 
competitive dynamics of this period fail to mention it at all.14  Other accounts 
offer a passing reference to it15 or devote a few pages to it.16  Indeed, only a 
handful of published works examine the history of the government takeover 
at any length,17 and these accounts focus on the political consequences of this 
 
13. See infra subpart III(D). 
14. E.g., FAULHABER, supra note 6; HUBER ET AL., supra note 6; KENNETH LIPARTITO, THE 
BELL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL BUSINESS: THE TELEPHONE IN THE SOUTH, 1877–1920 (1989); 
ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1989); Glen O. Robinson, The Federal 
Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 3 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). 
15. See, e.g., GERALD W. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF 
MARKET STRUCTURE 156 (1981) (mentioning the government’s control of telephone systems 
during World War I); JEFFREY E. COHEN, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 
38 (1992) (referencing the government’s experimentation with nationalization during World War I); 
CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940, at 50 
(1992) (making mention of the government’s one-year takeover of the telephone industry); AMY 
FRIEDLANDER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE 77 (1995) (citing the telephone 
system’s brief nationalization during World War I); 1 LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE NEW 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION 81 (1987) (noting the Post 
Office’s control of AT&T from August 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919 as part of the war effort); 
SUSAN E. MCMASTER, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 47 (2002) (same); MUELLER, supra 
note 10, at 133 (mentioning centralization); PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM 11 n.3 
(1987) (referencing the Postmaster General’s control over the telephone system); William P. Barnett 
& Glenn R. Carroll, How Institutional Constraints Affected the Organization of Early U.S. 
Telephony, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98, 112 (1993) (indicating the government’s brief period of control 
over the telephone industry); Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, The Common Carrier 
Provisions—A Product of Evolutionary Development, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 14, at 29 (mentioning the Post Office’s control of the 
telephone and telegraph companies as a wartime measure); Geoffrey M. Peters, Is the Third Time 
the Charm? A Comparison of the Government’s Major Antitrust Settlements with AT&T This 
Century, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 252, 257 (1985) (pointing out the government’s operation of the 
telephone systems during World War I). 
16. E.g., JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 150–53, 157–59 (1975); 
ROBERT BRITT HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 101–02 (1989); GEORGE P. OSLIN, THE STORY OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 278–79 (1992); J. WARREN STEHMAN, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 175–81 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1967) 
(1925); STONE, supra note 3, at 197–99; RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION 172–
73 (1994); Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the 
Bell System Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 267, 275–76 (1994); The Telegraph Industry: Monopoly or 
Competition, supra note 5, at 633–37. 
17. N.R. DANIELIAN, A.T.&T.: THE STORY OF INDUSTRIAL CONQUEST 243–70 (1939); 
RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 395–406 
(2010); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS 
SINCE 1918, at 26–59 (1989).  The only unpublished discussions of any significance of which we 
are aware are a dissertation by political scientist Kenneth Bickers and a brief note by an FCC 
economist.  Kenneth N. Bickers, The Politics of Regulatory Design: Telecommunications in 
Historical and Theoretical Perspective 134–56 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
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episode without discussing its consequences for the telecommunications 
system in general or its role in paving the way for AT&T’s return to 
monopoly and the establishment of universal service in particular.  The 
omission is rendered all the more curious by the recent heightening of 
interest in government ownership of communications networks, reflected in 
the support for municipal WiFi,18 the Dutch government’s efforts to promote 
the buildout of municipal broadband networks,19 the inclusion of government 
funds for U.S. broadband deployment in the 2009 stimulus package,20 and the 
Australian government’s decision to fund more than three quarters of the cost 
to build fiber optic cable to the home.21  In addition, some scholars have 
either advocated government funding of broadband networks22 or proposed 
giving the postal system a greater role in the Internet.23  These calls for the 
postalization of the Internet would do well to take into account the lessons 
from our nation’s past experience with the postalization of telecommunica-
tions. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I discusses certain 
developments that set the stage for the takeover.  These include the proposed 
takeover of the U.S. telegraph system, the nationalization of the British 
Telephone System, the wartime takeover of the U.S. railroad system, the 
early debates about nationalizing the U.S. telephone system, and the antitrust 
 
Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with authors); Douglas Galbi, Government Takeover of All Telephone 
Systems, PURPLE MOTES (Apr. 4, 2010), http://purplemotes.net/2010/04/04/government-takeover-
of-all-telephone-systems/. 
18. See François Bar & Namkee Park, Municipal Wi-Fi Networks: The Goals, Practices, and 
Policy Implications of the U.S. Case, 61 COMM. & STRATEGIES 107, 107 (2006) (commenting on 
the growing number of municipal Wi-Fi networks in the United States and abroad). 
19. Willem van Winden & Paulus Woets, Urban Broadband Internet Policies in Europe: A 
Critical Review, 41 URB. STUD. 2043, 2046, 2049–51 (2004). 
20. See Lynne Holt & Mark Jamison, Broadband and Contributions to Economic Growth: 
Lessons from the US Experience, 33 TELECOMM. POL’Y 575, 575 (2009) (examining the connection 
between information and communications technologies and economic growth, and noting that 
Congress approved $7.2 billion in funding for broadband planning and deployment initiatives as 
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
21. See Roland Montagne & Valérie Chaillou, Public Funding & FTTx: Assessing the Impact of 
Public Action, 80 COMM. & STRATEGIES 153, 161 (2010) (noting that Australia represents a prime 
example of a national project to build a neutral, national FTTH network and reporting that Australia 
has invested €30 billion in the construction of an open national network); see also National 
Broadband Network—Overview, DEP’T BROADBAND, COMM. & THE DIGITAL ECON., AUSTL. 
GOV’T, http://www.dbcde.gov.au/broadband/national_broadband_network/nbn_overview (last 
modified Dec. 18, 2012) (describing Australia’s National Broadband Network). 
22. E.g., SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND 
MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 263–67 (2013); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS 244 (2002); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 370 
(2010). 
23. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE U.S. POSTAL SERV., EMBRACING THE FUTURE: MAKING 
THE TOUGH CHOICES TO PRESERVE UNIVERSAL MAIL SERVICES 143–58 (2003), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/pcusps_report.pdf (positing that “a 
digital postal network will enhance the value of the mail as a 21st century communications mode 
and improve virtually every aspect of the nation’s postal service”). 
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scrutiny of AT&T that led to the Kingsbury Commitment.  Part II lays out 
the history of the takeover, analyzing its enactment by Congress, its 
operation by the Postmaster General, and the decision to return the wires.  
Part III examines the lessons of the takeover, discussing the Postmaster 
General’s active promotion of AT&T’s return to monopoly, the origins of 
universal service, the transformation of federal–state relations, and the 
acknowledgement of the limits of government control implicit in the decision 
to return the wires. 
I. Setting the Stage 
The failure of the Soviet bloc’s pattern of state-owned enterprises and 
the wide-scale privatization of telephone systems in recent years make it all 
too easy to reject government ownership as a viable policy option in modern 
history.  During the Progressive Era, however, “the specter of nationalization 
was present and gaining momentum,” a “fact [that] is often lost on historians 
of telephony during this era.”24  In fact, nationalization of the telephone 
system was not the exclusive province of socialists: A wide range of 
respectable voices, including many conservatives, supported government 
ownership.25  A better appreciation for key aspects of the historical context, 
including proposals for government ownership of the U.S. telegraph system, 
the 1911 nationalization of the British telephone system, Progressive hostility 
toward large enterprises that led to the Kingsbury Commitment, and early 
debates over nationalization, helps put the debates over government 
ownership into perspective. 
A. Proposals for Government Ownership of the U.S. Telegraph System 
The telegraph preceded the telephone as the dominant means of 
telecommunications, and policy makers debated the merits of public 
ownership since its earliest days.26  The history of the electromagnetic 
telegraph in the United States began on September 4, 1837, when Samuel 
Morse made a successful transmission across 1,700 feet of wire arranged in 
his classroom.27  Ill suited to commercializing the invention himself, he 
 
24. COHEN, supra note 15, at 38. 
25. JOHN, supra note 17, at 363–65, 372–74; STONE, supra note 3, at 141, 195. 
26. A report submitted by the Post Office to Congress in 1914 provides a useful overview of the 
early advocacy for government ownership of telecommunications.  POSTMASTER GEN., 
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF ELECTRICAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, S. DOC. NO. 63-399, at 
19–36 (2d Sess. 1914). 
27. OSLIN, supra note 16, at 19.  Morse was neither the first nor the only inventor working on 
telegraphy.  Beginning in 1793, France deployed an optical telegraph system that used a series of 
towers topped by a set of movable arms that could send signals in a semaphore-like manner.  In 
1809, a German inventor developed a telegraph that used electrochemical processes connected by 
thirty-five wires to communicate.  European inventors were also independently experimenting with 
electromagnetic telegraphs at more or less the same time as (indeed, perhaps slightly before) Morse.  
A.N. HOLCOMBE, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF TELEPHONES ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE 3–8 
(1911).  The U.S. Supreme Court would ultimately rule that Morse’s invention came first.  O’Reilly 
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convinced Congress to appropriate $30,000 to establish a telegraph 
connection between Washington, D.C. and Baltimore,28 through which 
Morse successfully sent a message on May 24, 1844.29 
At the time, many observers thought that the telegraph network should 
be owned and operated by the government.  For example, Henry Clay found 
that the telegraph “is destined to exert great influence on the business affairs 
of society.  In the hands of private individuals they will be able to 
monopolize intelligence and to perform the greatest operations in 
commerce . . . .  I think such an engine ought to be exclusively under the 
control of the [G]overnment.”30  Postmaster General Cave Johnson’s 1845 
and 1846 Reports similarly supported government ownership of the entire 
telegraph system.31 
In 1866, Congress enacted legislation that gave the government a five-
year right to purchase all the telegraph lines at a value appraised by five 
disinterested arbitrators.32  The following year, Andrew Johnson’s Postmaster 
General, Alexander Randall, urged Congress to study the possibility of a 
postal takeover of the telegraph system.33  In 1871, shortly after the 
government’s option to purchase the telegraph system expired, Postmaster 
General John Creswell endorsed the idea of a postal telegraph, pointing to the 
fact that Great Britain had nationalized its telegraph system in 1870.34  This 
recommendation drew the approbation of President Ulysses S. Grant, who 
“recommend[ed] favorable consideration of the plan for uniting the 
telegraphic system of the United States with the postal system.”35  Not only 
would public ownership reduce rates while rendering the same level of 
service, if not better36: “It would secure the further advantage of extending 
 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 108 (1853); see also Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511, 513 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,036) (holding that Morse had a right to patent the new method). 
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 84, § 1, 5 Stat. 618; OSLIN, supra note 16, at 32. 
29. OSLIN, supra note 17, at 32–33. 
30. Letter from Henry Clay to Alfred Vail (Sept. 10, 1844), reprinted in Frank G. Carpenter, 
Henry Clay on Nationalizing the Telegraph, 154 N. AM. REV. 380, 382 (1892). 
31. CAVE JOHNSON, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, S. DOC. NO. 29-1, at 861 (1st 
Sess. 1845); CAVE JOHNSON, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, S. DOC. NO. 29-1, at 688–89 
(2d Sess. 1846).  Morse even offered to sell the patent to the federal government for $100,000, see 
S. DOC. NO. 63-399, at 19, and apparently attempted to give the patent to the Republic of Texas in 
1838.  OSLIN, supra note 16, at 23.  
32. Act of July 24, 1866, ch. 230, § 3, 14 Stat. 221, 221–22. 
33. ALEXANDER RANDALL, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-
1, pt. 4, at 29 (2d Sess. 1867). 
34. JOHN CRESWELL, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 42-1, 
pt. 4, at 28–9 (2d Sess. 1871). 
35. President Ulysses S. Grant, Third Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1871), in 7 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 149–50 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1898). 
36. “[B]y such a course the cost of telegraphing could be much reduced, and the service as well, 
if not better, rendered.”  Id. at 150. 
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the telegraph through portions of the country where private enterprise will 
not construct it,” as well as promote commerce and education.37 
During 1871 and 1872, Congress seriously debated government 
ownership of the telegraph system, dividing between one proposal (endorsed 
by the President and the Postmaster General) under which the federal 
government would take possession of the entire telegraph system and merge 
it with the post office,38 and another proposal (backed by Gardiner Hubbard, 
who would eventually become President of the Bell System as well as 
Alexander Graham Bell’s father-in-law) that would place the entire industry 
in the hands of a single private company that was granted special privileges 
by the government and give the government preferential terms.39  Congress 
deadlocked over these proposals and failed to enact either of them.40  
Creswell would repeat his call for government ownership of the telegraph 
system in 1872 and 1873 to no avail.41 
The matter lay quiescent until 1880, when a visit to the British post 
office prompted Postmaster General Horace Maynard to ask whether the 
federal government should once again take up the issue of public ownership 
of the telegraph system.42  These calls were renewed in 1882 and 1883 by 
Postmasters General Timothy Howe and Walter Gresham.43  Minority 
political party platforms in the 1880s echoed these sentiments.  The 
Greenback Party platform of 1884 demanded “the establishment of a 
 
37. Id. 
38. Gardiner Hubbard, The Proposed Changes in the Telegraph System, 117 N. AM. REV. 80, 
102–03 (1873). 
39. Id. at 103–04. 
40. Cf. id. at 104 (stating that time ran out before the proposal could be considered that session, 
and history shows us that they ultimately were not successful). 
41. JOHN CRESWELL, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 42-1, 
pt. 4, at 21–35 (3d Sess. 1872); JOHN CRESWELL, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, H.R. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 43-1, pt. 4, at xxxiii–xxxvii (1st Sess. 1873).  Congressional consideration of 
government ownership occurred contemporaneously with national political parties advocating for 
increased government regulation of the telegraph.  The Labor Reform Party’s platform of 1872 
resolved that “it is the duty of the government to so exercise its power over railroads and telegraph 
corporations that they shall not in any case be privileged to exact such rates . . . as may bear unduly 
or inequitably upon either producer or consumer.”  LABOR REFORM PLATFORM OF 1872, in 1 
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1956, at 43 (Donald B. Johnson ed., 1978).  Likewise, the 
Prohibition Party’s platform of 1872 called for reduction of telegraph rates “to the lowest practical 
point, by force of laws wisely and justly framed, with reference not only to the interest of capital 
employed but to the higher claim of the general good.”  PROHIBITION PLATFORM OF 1872, in 1 
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1956, supra, at 46.  In 1876, the Prohibition Party also called 
for the “reduction of the rates of inland and ocean postage of telegraphic communication.”  
PROHIBITION REFORM PLATFORM OF 1876, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1956, supra, 
at 52. 
42. HORACE MAYNARD, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 46-1, 
pt. 4, at 42 (3d Sess. 1880). 
43. TIMOTHY HOWE, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 47-1, 
pt. 4, at xxvii–xxx (2d Sess. 1882); WALTER GRESHAM, REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, 
H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 48-1, pt. 4, at 33–37 (1st Sess. 1883). 
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government postal telegraph system.”44  The Union Labor Party of 1888 
declared, “The means of communication and transportation shall be owned 
by the people, as is the United States postal system.”45  In accord with these 
calls for government action, between 1871 and 1884, Congress considered 
over two dozen proposals to nationalize the telegraph system, three quarters 
of which were apparently reported favorably out of committee.46  None, 
however, was ever enacted.47 
In 1901, the Industrial Commission heard testimony from Professor 
Frank Parsons advocating government ownership.48  The Postal Service 
Appropriations Act of 1901 contained a provision directing the Postmaster 
General “to report to Congress the probable cost of connecting a telegraph 
and telephone system with the postal service by some feasible plan,”49 
although it does not appear that the Postmaster General ever did so.50  Aside 
from a passing mention by George Cortelyou in 1906 including the postal 
telephone in a laundry list of future improvements to the postal system,51 no 
further action was taken for more than a decade despite continuing support 
from minority parties.52 
Interest returned in 1912, when Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock 
once again proposed, “The telegraph lines in the United States should be 
made a part of the postal system,”53 only to see that recommendation 
specifically disavowed by President Taft’s message transmitting this report.  
Taft “believe[d] that the true principle is that private enterprise should be 
permitted to carry on such public utilities under due regulation as to rates by 
proper authority rather than that the Government should itself conduct 
them.”54  Taft thought it would be bad public policy “greatly to increase the 
 
44. GREENBACK NATIONAL PLATFORM OF 1884, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–
1956, supra note 41, at 69–70. 
45. UNION LABOR PLATFORM OF 1888, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1956, supra 
note 41, at 83. 
46. See POSTMASTER GEN., GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF ELECTRICAL MEANS OF 
COMMUNICATION, S. DOC. NO. 63-399, at 30 (2d Sess. 1914) (explaining that over seventy bills had 
been introduced to Congress for the purpose of establishing a postal telegraph and sixteen times the 
House and Senate Committees had reported favorably on the issue). 
47. Id.; COHEN, supra note 15, at 37. 
48. S. DOC. NO. 63-399, at 33. 
49. Postal Service Appropriations Act of 1901, ch. 851, 31 Stat. 1099, 1104. 
50. S. DOC. NO. 63-399, at 35. 
51. GEORGE B. CORTELYOU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1906, H.R. DOC. NO. 59-4, at 81 (2d Sess. 1906). 
52. The People’s Party platform of 1908 stated: “To perfect the postal service, the Government 
should own and operate the general telegraph and telephone systems and provide a parcels post.”  
PEOPLE’S PLATFORM OF 1908, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1956, supra note 41, at 
155. 
53. FRANK H. HITCHCOCK, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1911, H.R. DOC. NO. 62-118, at 14 (2d Sess. 1912). 
54. PRESIDENT WILLIAM H. TAFT, MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 62-559, at 8 (2d Sess. 1912). 
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body of public servants.”55  Although the argument for government 
ownership would be strong if government could operate the system “at a less 
price . . . and with equal efficiency,” Taft was 
not satisfied from any evidence that if these properties were taken over 
by the Government they could be managed any more economically or 
any more efficiently or that this would enable the Government to 
furnish service at any smaller rate than the public are now required to 
pay by private companies.56 
In any event, Taft believed that any such initiatives should be postponed 
until after the Post Office had established a postal savings bank and a parcel 
post.57 
Still, at this point, AT&T was sufficiently optimistic to predict in its 
annual report that “[t]he discussion of the government ownership of wire 
companies is not likely to become anything more than academic, at least for 
the present.”58  The company was sufficiently concerned, however, to devote 
four additional pages to laying out arguments against government ownership 
of the telegraph system.59  The report concluded, “The facts are, that there is 
hardly a telegraph or telephone system in the world now operated by any 
government which shows a profit, even under accounting methods employed, 
and not one that would not show a deficit under accounting methods 
obligatory upon private enterprise.”60 
Undeterred by the President’s opposition, Postmaster General 
Hitchcock’s next report in 1912 did not back down, arguing that government 
ownership of the telegraph lines would lower rates, and that the successful 
creation of the postal savings system and the parcel post justified renewing 
attention on the proposal.61 
The advent of the Wilson Administration brought in a new Postmaster 
General, Albert S. Burleson, who would play a pivotal role in the debates 
over government ownership.  Indeed, Burleson would advocate government 
ownership of the telephone system with a zeal that strained the limits of even 
the most ardent Progressive.62  On December 1, 1913, Burleson submitted his 
initial annual report, which adhered to Hitchcock’s position: “The 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1911, at 36 
(1912). 
59. Id. at 36–40. 
60. Id. at 39–40. 
61. FRANK H. HITCHCOCK, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1912, H.R. DOC. NO. 62-931, at 13 (3d Sess. 1913). 
62. See Adrian Anderson, President Wilson’s Politician: Albert Sidney Burleson of Texas, 77 
SW. HIST. Q. 339, 345 (1974) (noting that Burleson’s advocacy of government ownership of the 
telephone system was “a goal that was really a little too radical even for most Progressives”). 
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monopolistic nature of the telegraph business makes it of vital importance to 
the people that it be conducted by unselfish interests, and this can be 
accomplished only through Government ownership.”63  Expanding his point 
to include the telephone system, Burleson wrote, “Every argument in favor of 
Government ownership of telegraph lines may be advanced with equal logic 
and force in favor of the Government ownership of telephone lines.”64  The 
report indicated that the Post Office Department was conducting an 
investigation and promised to submit a legislative proposal shortly.65 
B. The Nationalization of the British Telephone System 
Another consideration that framed and colored debates over 
nationalization was the global trend toward governmental ownership of 
telephone systems.  Manitoba had nationalized its telephone system in 
1907.66  Even more importantly, Great Britain had nationalized its telephone 
system in 1911.67  Indeed, by 1913, the United States was the only major 
country whose telephone system was not publicly owned.68 
The fact that Britain implemented a highly successful rate cut 
immediately following the government takeover made government 
ownership seem alluring to many.69  The demand for nationalization in the 
United Kingdom also came from the postal service’s fear of loss of 
revenue.70  As Harper explains it: “The reason [for nationalization] was fear 
that [private telegrams] would damage the revenues of the postal service, 
coupled with serious dissatisfaction among the business community about the 
service being given by competing private interests.”71 
 
63. ALBERT S. BURLESON, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1913, H.R. DOC. NO. 63-712, at 15 (2d Sess. 1914). 
64. Id. at 16. 
65. Id. 
66. JAMES MAVOR, GOVERNMENT TELEPHONES: THE EXPERIENCE OF MANITOBA CANADA 
26–28 (1917). 
67. STONE, supra note 3, at 141.  For the classic study on public ownership of telephone 
systems in Europe, see generally HOLCOMBE, supra note 27. 
68. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
69. See STONE, supra note 3, at 41–42 (“Earlier regulatory statutes had failed to bring rates 
down, leading to the drive to nationalize a business that was widely conceived as a public service.”); 
Revision of Telephone Rates, TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1912, at 13 (quoting Postmaster General 
Herbert Samuel as stating that “it would be necessary before long to revise the rates of telephone 
users” and explaining that the rates “were at present unequal, in some cases not wholly equitable”); 
Telephone Trunk Calls: Introduction of Lower Rates, TIMES (London), Aug. 8, 1912, at 2 (reporting 
the announcement of Postmaster General Samuel that “he proposes to introduce lower rates for the 
use of telephone trunk lines during the less busy hours of the day,” with reductions ranging from 
one-quarter to three-quarters of the ordinary rates). 
70. JOHN HARPER, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE 
PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 5 (1997). 
71. Id. 
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C. The Government Takeovers of the U.S. Railroad and Radio Systems 
The takeover of the telephone system also took place in the shadow of 
the federal government’s decision to take over the railroad system.72  Unlike 
the telephone system, after years of corporate mismanagement and restrictive 
rate regulation by the ICC, the railroad industry was in a state of financial 
and operational disarray.73  The flood of traffic to the Atlantic ports pushed 
the rail network to the brink of collapse.74  Moreover, the industry had long 
sought coordination of the entire industry by a single entity to curb what it 
viewed as the excesses of competition.75 
Congress had anticipated the need for the government to take control of 
the railroads by including a provision in the Army Appropriations Act of 
1916 authorizing the President to do so in the event of war.76  Wilson issued 
the proclamation taking over the railroad system on December 28, 1917.77  
Congress ratified his decision by enacting the Federal Control Act on 
March 21, 1918.78  The takeover was supported both by the industry, which 
welcomed cartelization as a sanctuary from unbridled competition, and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which embraced the idea of “Scientific 
Management.”79 
Government operation of the rail system under the direction of the U.S. 
Railway Administration (USRA) (headed by William Gibbs McAdoo, 
Treasury Secretary and Wilson’s son-in-law) proved controversial.  Most 
controversial was the approval of a 28% across-the-board increase in rates.80  
McAdoo’s determination to maintain labor peace and avoid strikes led him to 
order a series of wage increases, extend the eight-hour day to all rail 
employees, promote union membership by encouraging collective 
bargaining, and create an elaborate system of job classifications.81  The 
increased costs caused the railroads to operate at a substantial deficit.82 
 
72. See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 150 (“With the coming of war, agitation for government 
ownership [of the telephone system] greatly increased . . . .  Government takeover of the railroads 
[in December 1917] fanned the flames; thereafter, advocates of a telephone takeover argued that 
government-run railroads and privately run wire communications constituted a logical 
inconsistency.”). 
73. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 241 (2001). 
74. Id.; Landon H. Rowland, The Last Hurrah for the Gilded Age: The 1917 Nationalization of 
U.S. Railways, Remarks at the World War I Museum 5 (Nov. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.landonrowland.com/RailroadSpeechFINAL.pdf. 
75. Rowland, supra note 74, at 5–6. 
76. Army Appropriations Act of 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 645. 
77. President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation (Dec. 26, 1917), in 17 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8409, 8410 (James D. Richardson ed., 1921). 
78. Federal Control Act, ch. 25, 40 Stat. 451 (1918). 
79. Rowland, supra note 74, at 9. 
80. Id. at 10; see also ELY, supra note 15, at 244 (discussing rates increases generally); 
GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877–1916, at 228 (1965) (discussing specific rate 
increases). 
81. ELY, supra note 73, at 244–45. 
82. Id. at 245. 
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The cessation of hostilities raised the question of what to do next.  The 
Federal Railroad Control Act of 1918 only authorized government control 
through twenty-one months after the end of hostilities,83 which Wilson noted 
in his Annual Message expired in January 1921.84  The fact that the USRA 
had been more generous in rates than the ICC made the railroads in no hurry 
to reclaim control.85  The generous wage increases and work rules made the 
labor unions supportive as well.86  The shippers who had borne the burden of 
the rate and wage increases disagreed.87 
Senator Albert Cummins (R-Iowa) introduced legislation on 
September 2, 1919, that would have consolidated the industry into a single 
entity, outlawed strikes, and based rates on a “fair” return on capital.88  
Although this bill passed the Senate, it faced opposition in the House, led by 
shippers complaining about the rate increases and who preferred the more 
shipper-friendly ICC.89  Pressured by Wilson’s announced intention to end 
federal control on March 1, 1920,90 Congress enacted compromise 
legislation.91  The effect of the legislation was to reinstate the prewar status 
quo, while protecting the industry from competition by authorizing pooling 
arrangements (subject to ICC approval), authorizing the ICC to set minimum 
as well as maximum rates, and forcing the most profitable lines to subsidize 
weaker lines.92  It also gave railroads a two-year guarantee of 5.5% return on 
investment and established a Railroad Labor Board to settle labor disputes.93 
The government’s contemporaneous takeover of the U.S. radio system 
has drawn less attention.  The Navy had argued for government control over 
radio communications even before the war broke out.94  Representative 
Joshua W. Alexander, Chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over the 
issue, introduced legislation in December 1916 that would have authorized 
 
83. Federal Railroad Control Act, ch. 25, § 14, 40 Stat. 451, 458 (1918). 
84. President Woodrow Wilson, Sixth Annual Address (Dec. 2, 1918), in 18 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 8645. 
85. Rowland, supra note 74, at 12. 
86. ELY, supra note 73, at 245. 
87. Id. 
88. S. 2906, 66th Cong. (1919). 
89. Rowland, supra note 74, at 13. 
90. President Woodrow Wilson, A Proclamation (Dec. 24, 1919), in 18 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 8804, 8804–05. 
91. Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 457. 
92. ELY, supra note 73, at 246–47. 
93. Rowland, supra note 74, at 13. 
94. SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899–1922, at 258 (1987); 
PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, 1920–1934, at 21–22 (1980); Ronald E. Sutton, The Nationalization of the United 
States Radio System in 1917, 10 J. VISUAL LITERACY 8, 9, 12 (1990).  Some lower Navy officials 
disagreed.  ROSEN, supra, at 22. 
996 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:983 
 
the Navy to take control over the entire radio system.95  After hearings 
conducted in January 1917,96 these proposals were allowed to die in 
committee.97  The outbreak of war allowed the President to invoke the 
provision of the Radio Act of 1912 authorizing him to close or take control 
of all radio stations during times of war,98 which Wilson asserted on the very 
day the Senate ratified his declaration of war on Germany.99 
The Navy ran the radio system with an iron fist.  It incorporated more 
than fifty commercial stations into its network and closed all of the others.100  
It shut down all amateur operators, requiring that they certify that they had 
lowered their antennae and disconnected and sealed all of their transmitting 
and receiving equipment.101  Then, Undersecretary of the Navy Franklin D. 
Roosevelt broke the logjam caused by blocking patents102 by indemnifying 
all companies from liability for patent infringement.103  The Navy also 
acquired radio companies both to consolidate patents and the industry 
structure.104  As we shall see, during this time, the Navy testified in support 
of the federal takeover of the telephone system.105 
 
95. H.R. 19350, 64th Cong. § 6 (2d Sess. 1916); see also Wireless Bill Introduced, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 1916, at 12, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A06EEDD153B 
E633A25753C2A9649D946796D6CF (noting the date of introduction). 
96. Radio Communication: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Merch. Marine & Fisheries 
on H.R. 19350, 64th Cong. 3 (1917) (statement of Joshua W. Alexander, Chairman). 
97. DOUGLAS, supra note 94, at 282; Sutton, supra note 94, at 12–13. 
98. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat. 302, 303. 
99. President Woodrow Wilson, Executive Order 2582 (Apr. 6, 1917), in 17 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 8241. 
100. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR 1917, H.R. DOC. NO. 65-618, at 44 (2d Sess. 1917). 
101. Sutton, supra note 94, at 14. 
102. In 1917, the Second Circuit upheld the validity of a Marconi-held patent that was essential 
to the vacuum tube.  See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co., 243 
F. 560, 565–67 (2d Cir. 1917) (upholding the lower court’s finding of a valid Marconi-held patent 
and rejecting De Forest’s counterclaim for patent infringement).  Other key patents needed by 
vacuum tubes were held by AT&T and Columbia student Edwin H. Armstrong.  1 ERIK BARNOUW, 
A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 47 (1966).  General 
Electric held the patent on another key vacuum-tube technology known as the Alexanderson 
alternator.  Id. at 48–49. 
103. GLEASON L. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926, at 137, 138 n.12 (1938); Sutton, supra 
note 94, at 15.  The government’s initial position was that the Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-
305, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851, transferred any liability for patent infringement from the government 
contractors to the government.  OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS & LIBRARY, HISTORY OF THE BUREAU 
OF ENGINEERING OF THE NAVY DURING THE WORLD WAR 128–29 (1922).  The Supreme Court 
rejected this conclusion.  Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. Simon, 246 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1918).  
Congress subsequently enacted legislation establishing that the only remedy for patents infringed by 
government contractors would be against the United States.  Naval Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
65-182, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918). 
104. OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS & LIBRARY, supra note 103, at 113–14; ROSEN, supra note 
94, at 23; Sutton, supra note 94, at 15–16. 
105. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.  Support within the Navy was not universal.  
Chief of Naval Operations Captain David Todd argued that unlike radio communications, wireline 
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On November 21, 1918, ten days after the end of the war, Chairman 
Alexander submitted a bill supported by both Wilson and Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels that would have given the Navy permanent control.106  
Daniels’s Annual Report of December 1 opined that the Navy’s successful 
operation of the commercial radio system “presages the way for making this 
service entirely governmental.”107  Alexander’s committee conducted 
hearings on the proposal from December 12–19.108  The Navy found little 
industry support, having tactlessly alienated both the large industry players 
and amateur enthusiasts.109  It also dissipated its energies jousting with other 
federal departments such as the Post Office, the Commerce Department, and 
the Army, which were also attempting to assert control over the radio 
industry, and failed to marshal popular and congressional support.110  The 
new Republican Congress proved less amenable than its Democratic 
predecessor.111  The Committee was particularly angered by the Navy’s 
acquisition of radio companies, which led to the tabling of the bill,112 the 
enactment of an appropriations rider prohibiting further acquisitions,113 and 
calls for the divestiture of the acquired properties114 and even Daniels’s 
impeachment.115  The Navy tried again in July 1919,116 only to face similar 
opposition.117 
The Navy’s belief that the American Marconi Company was controlled 
by British interests led it to view returning the radio industry to its prior 
owners as unacceptable.118  It approached Owen D. Young, who was General 
Counsel to General Electric, to form a new company known as the Radio 
 
communications were less subject to interference and were provided by companies that were more 
cooperative.  Sutton, supra note 94, at 16–17. 
106. H.R. 13159, 65th Cong. (2d Sess. 1918). 
107. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, H.R. DOC. NO. 
65-1450, at 22 (3d Sess. 1918). 
108. Government Control of Radio Communication: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the 
Merch. Marine & Fisheries on H.R. 13159, 65th Cong. (1918). 
109. Sutton, supra note 94, at 19. 
110. Id. at 10, 19. 
111. DOUGLAS, supra note 94, at 282. 
112. Id. at 283. 
113. Blocks Purchase of Radio Systems: House Amends Naval Bill to Prevent Diversion of 
Steam Engineering Bureau Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1919, http://query.nytimes.com/ 
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F0061FF73B5D147A93CAA91789D85F4D8185F9. 
114. Wants Radios Returned: Congressman Rowe Also Thinks $3,000,000 Should Be 
Recovered, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1919, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res= 
F50E1FF6385D147A93CAA8178AD85F4D8185F9. 
115. Wants Daniels Ousted: Mann Says He Should Be Impeached for Radio Purchases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1919, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20A14FB3B5D147 
A93C2AA178AD85F4D8185F9. 
116. S. 3399, 66th Cong. (1st Sess. 1919). 
117. DOUGLAS, supra note 94, at 284. 
118. Id. 
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Company of America (RCA) guaranteed to be under American control.119  
American Marconi transferred all of its assets into the company in exchange 
for RCA stock.120  RCA, General Electric, and AT&T entered into cross-
licensing agreements that neutralized the patent thicket obstructing U.S. 
development.121  The effect was to create a government-sanctioned 
monopoly.122 
D. Labor Conflict 
These debates took place in the shadow of a looming telegraph 
operators’ strike designed to force Western Union to unionize.123  The 
Commercial Telegraphers’ Union initially called the strike for April 9, 1918, 
but postponed it to permit arbitration by the War Labor Board.124  After that 
failed, the union called for another strike on July 8, only to relent once again 
at the request of the Secretary of Labor.125  The war footing made the strike 
particularly controversial.  As one contemporary editorialist put it, labor 
strife and labor rights “must be instantly swept aside if they in the slightest 
degree threaten the country’s efforts to win the war.”126  Some advocates saw 
government control as a means of maintaining service levels despite rising 
labor militancy and the corresponding increased threat of strikes.127 
E. Progressive Sentiment and the Kingsbury Commitment 
Debates over government ownership of the telephone system were also 
framed by the rise of the Progressive movement.  Some Progressives 
expressed strong distrust for large organizations and advocated strong 
antitrust enforcement to return to an economy dominated by small 
businesses.128  Although they were suspicious of big government, they 
generally distrusted corporations more.129  Others accepted corporations as a 
 
119. RCA’s charter stipulated that only U.S. citizens could serve as officers or directors and 
required that foreigners own no more than 20% of the stock.  BARNOUW, supra note 102, at 59. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 60. 
122. DOUGLAS, supra note 94, at 288. 
123. MAY, supra note 17, at 28–30; OSLIN, supra note 16, at 278. 
124. OSLIN, supra note 16, at 278. 
125. Washington Plea Prevents Strike on Western Union: Operators’ Chief Yields to the 
Appeals of Secretary Wilson and Gompers, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1918, http://query.nytimes.com/ 
mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F60911FB355F157A93CAA9178CD85F4C8185F9. 
126. George Harvey, The Postal and the Western Union, N. AM. REV.’S WAR WKLY., June 22, 
1918, at 7. 
127. See OSLIN, supra note 16, at 278 (indicating that President Wilson’s reaction to the 
increased risk of strikes was to announce that Postmaster General Burleson would take over the 
telegraph and telephone systems for the government). 
128. For a classic statement, see Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 
10, 1914, at 21, available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015022184223 (recommending 
implementing legislation with an antitrust focus in order to “remedy the evils” of railroad 
monopolies). 
129. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 229, 231, 233 (1955). 
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part of modern life and instead favored curbing them through technocratic 
regulation.130  To these Progressives, the goal of returning to the old 
competitive order was a chimera.131 
This ambivalence created a large gap between rhetoric and reality.132  
Notwithstanding his reputation as the preeminent trustbuster in history, 
Theodore Roosevelt expressed reservations about aggressive antitrust 
enforcement, criticizing “the impossible task of restoring flintlock conditions 
of business sixty years ago.”133  He therefore brought surprisingly few 
antitrust cases and limited the Antitrust Division to five attorneys and an 
annual budget of $100,000.134  Woodrow Wilson similarly regarded the 
emergence of large enterprises as “characteristic of our time” and “normal 
and inevitable” and stated that “we shall never return to the old order of 
individual competition.”135  To them, bigness was not bad per se; instead, it 
was culpable only when it crossed certain lines.136  Ironically, it was the non-
Progressive William Howard Taft who asserted the antitrust laws most 
vigorously.137 
This ambivalence became apparent in the government’s policies with 
respect to AT&T.  When competition first emerged in 1894, AT&T’s initial 
reaction was to attempt to outbuild the independents.138  The result was a 
boon to consumers.  The number of telephone connections, which had been 
growing at the somewhat languid annual rate of 6% prior to 1894, jumped to 
20%.139  Initially, the independents focused on areas that the Bell System had 
ignored, such as rural areas, small towns, and the suburbs of major cities.140  
Over time, they began to enter into direct competition with Bell.  By 1902, 
competition existed in more than half of all cities with populations of greater 
than five thousand people.141  Consumers who purchased both connections 
 
130. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 357 (1909); G. EDWARD WHITE, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 104 (1978). 
131. CROLY, supra note 130, at 358–59. 
132. HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 252–53. 
133. President Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt’s Confession of Faith at the National 
Convention of the Progressive Party 27 (Aug. 6, 1912). 
134. HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 245. 
135. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 163 (1913); Woodrow Wilson, Response of 
Woodrow Wilson to Notification Address at the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 7, 1912), in 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1912, at 
400, 407 (Urey Woodson ed., 1912). 
136. HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 248. 
137. Bickers, supra note 17, at 108. 
138. Richard Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893–1920, 34 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340, 354 (1969); Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to 
Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 122, 124 (1994). 
139. Gabel, supra note 138, at 350 tbl.4. 
140. See id. at 343–44 (arguing that Bell’s method of providing service prevented it from 
developing residential, suburban, and rural service went largely undeveloped, which restricted 
Bell’s growth). 
141. VIETOR, supra note 16, at 170; Gabel, supra note 138, at 344. 
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could typically connect to five to ten times the number of other customers 
while paying less than the cost of buying a single connection during the 
monopoly period.142 
From AT&T’s standpoint, this strategy turned out to be a dismal failure.  
AT&T’s prices, profits, and stock price plummeted, and the capital 
requirements strained the company’s ability to raise capital.143  By 1907, 
AT&T’s market share had fallen below 50%.144  The financial markets had 
had enough.  The Morgan banking interests took over the company and 
forced a change in management, installing Theodore Vail as president.145  
Under Vail’s leadership, the company stopped competing directly with the 
independents and instead began pursuing two classic anticompetitive 
strategies.  As an initial matter, they attempted to merge to monopoly by 
offering to buy out independents with whom they competed directly.146  If the 
independent refused to sell, they pursued a classic division of markets by 
offering to withdraw from direct competition in return for a promise from the 
independent that it would not expand its territory and would interconnect 
with AT&T’s long-distance network.147 
Vail justified the consolidation of all telephone companies into a single 
system with his “belie[f] that the telephone system should be universal, 
interdependent and intercommunicating, affording opportunity for any 
subscriber of any exchange to communicate with any other subscriber of any 
other exchange.”148  AT&T backed its strategy of withdrawing from 
competition with what has been described as the first major corporate public-
relations campaign in history decrying the cost and inconvenience of having 
to maintain two separate connections, each with its own lines and handsets 
(known as dual service).149  To compensate for the lack of price discipline 
 
142. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 94; Robert Bornholz & David S. Evans, The Early History of 
Competition in the Telephone Industry, in BREAKING UP BELL 7, 30 (David S. Evans ed., 1983); 
David F. Weiman & Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell 
Telephone Company, 1894–1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103, 123–24 (1994); see also G. JOHNSTON, 
SOME COMMENTS ON THE 1907 ANNUAL REPORT OF AT&T 15–16 (1908) (describing the dramatic 
drop in the Bell System’s rates). 
143. Gabel, supra note 138, at 345–46; Weiman & Levin, supra note 142, at 109–23; 
MUELLER, supra note 10, at 70. 
144. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES: 1917—TELEPHONES 11 
(1920), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1917telephones.pdf 
(noting that Bell reported 51.2% of the market share in 1907). 
145. Gabel, supra note 138, at 345. 
146. See, e.g., AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 1910, at 21 (1911) (“Wherever it could be legally done, and done with the 
acquiescence of the public, opposition companies have been acquired and merged into the Bell 
System.”). 
147. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local 
Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 71 (2008). 
148. AT&T CO., supra note 146, at 22–23. 
149. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 147, at 71. 
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resulting from the elimination of competition, AT&T dropped its long-
standing opposition to government oversight and willingly submitted to rate 
regulation.150 
The result was an abrupt end to the erosion of AT&T’s market share.151  
Some competitors began to complain that the mergers represented a violation 
of the antitrust laws.152  These complaints did not prompt any immediate 
action by the Taft Administration, which despite its willingness to use the 
antitrust laws to break up Standard Oil and American Tobacco,153 viewed 
each telephone merger as an independent event instead of evaluating them as 
part of a systematic campaign.154  Independents warned that although each 
individual acquisition involved purely intrastate commerce, “[t]he avowed 
purpose of the Bell Company is to buy or crowd out the independent 
companies, which in the end will give them a complete monopoly of the 
telephone.”155  The Attorney General referred the matter to the ICC, which 
declined to act and eventually dropped the investigation.156 
Toward the end of the Taft Administration, however, the Justice 
Department began to view AT&T’s acquisition campaign with greater 
skepticism.  Concerned about acting too hastily and giving the appearance of 
political grandstanding on the eve of a presidential election, the Attorney 
General simply asked AT&T not to consummate any pending transactions 
until after the election,157 a request with which AT&T complied.158  The 
Wilson Administration successfully settled the case on December 13, 1913, 
when AT&T agreed to the so-called Kingsbury Commitment, named after 
the AT&T Vice President, Nathan Kingsbury, who brokered it.159  According 
 
150. AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1907, at 18 
(1908). 
151. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 147, at 73. 
152. See, e.g., Letter from Edward F. Murray, President, Murray’s Line, to George W. 
Wickersham, Att’y Gen. (Nov. 13, 1912), cited in Bickers, supra note 17, at 116 n.64.  See 
generally Letter from George W. Wickersham, Att’y Gen., to Charles A. Prouty, Chairman, 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n (Jan. 7, 1913), quoted in Bickers, supra note 17, at 113–14 
(summarizing these complaints). 
153. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1911); United States v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 188 (1911). 
154. Bickers, supra note 17, at 115. 
155. Letter from Edward F. Murray, President, Murray’s Line, to George W. Wickersham, 
Att’y Gen. (Nov. 23, 1912), quoted in Bickers, supra note 17, at 116. 
156. Press Release, Interstate Commerce Comm’n, Investigation of Telephone and Telegraph 
Companies, Docket No. 5462 (Apr. 15, 1914), cited in Bickers, supra note 17, at 115 n.63. 
157. Memorandum from George W. Wickersham, Att’y Gen., to J.A. Fowler, Assistant to the 
Att’y Gen. (Aug. 29, 1912), quoted in Bickers, supra note 17, at 117. 
158. Letter from Theodore Vail, President, AT&T, to the presidents of all associated Bell 
telephone companies (Aug. 6, 1912), cited in Bickers, supra note 17, at 118 n.69. 
159. Burleson stated, “If the efficient management and direction is given the telegraph and 
telephone that has been given the Postal Service, the probability is that they never will be returned 
to private control.”  DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 246; see also Bickers, supra note 17, at 147 
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to the terms of the agreement, AT&T pledged to stop acquiring directly 
competing companies.160  AT&T also promised to divest its ownership stake 
in Western Union and to permit the independents to interconnect with its 
long-distance network.161 
Commentators have not been kind to the Kingsbury Commitment.  
Some complain that by allowing the Bell System to keep the properties 
instead of breaking it up as it did with Standard Oil, the antitrust authorities 
effectively condoned monopoly by refusing to undo the existing acquisitions 
and leaving them intact.162  Others have complained that the Kingsbury 
Commitment was toothless.  For example, the Commitment did not prevent 
AT&T from acquiring independent local telephone companies with which it 
did not directly compete.163  Even where companies competed directly, other 
scholars claim that the Justice Department permitted mergers so long as 
AT&T divested an equal number of lines elsewhere.164  Others are somewhat 
less critical, insisting that the Kingsbury Commitment was successful in 
slowing down mergers temporarily.165  As discussed below, the Kingsbury 
Commitment was more effective than commonly thought at slowing 
consolidation.166  In any event, the Kingsbury Commitment was an important 
progressive policy preceding the nationalization of the wires. 
F. Early Debates over Nationalizing the U.S. Telephone System 
Interest in government ownership of the telegraph system began to 
extend to the telephone system as well in late 1913.  The New York Times 
reported in October of that year, “Notwithstanding efforts at profound 
secrecy, it has become known here that the Wilson Administration is 
 
(characterizing the temporary nationalization of the telephone lines as an experiment in government 
control as a permanent policy); STEHMAN, supra note 16, at 177 (same). 
160. DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 76. 
161. Id.  Before the Kingsbury Commitment, courts had been reluctant to rely on the antitrust 
laws to justify mandating interconnection with the long-distance network.  See U.S. Tel. Co. v. 
Cent. Union Tel. Co., 202 F. 66, 72 (6th Cir. 1913) (declining to discuss whether an exchange could 
be compelled to provide long-distance service); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 705 
(E.D. Wash. 1912) (holding that a company had no right to demand a physical connection with 
another line). 
162. WU, supra note 7, at 56; see also Dean Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire 
and Radio: A Retrospective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 87 (1985) (a former FCC Chairman noting that 
“by the time of the so-called Kingsbury Commitment in 1913, . . . AT&T’s monopolization of the 
telephone industry was well on its way to becoming an accomplished fact”); Harry M. Trebing, 
Common Carrier Regulation—The Silent Crisis, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 305 (1969) 
(calling the reestablishment of monopoly “a fait accompli by 1913”). 
163. COHEN, supra note 15, at 48; VIETOR, supra note 16, at 172; Gabel, supra note 138, at 
352–53. 
164. BROCK, supra note 15, at 155–56; Thierer, supra note 16, at 272. 
165. HUBER ET AL., supra note 6, § 4.4.2; MUELLER, supra note 10, at 134. 
166. See infra section III(A)(2). 
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engaged in preparing the groundwork” for nationalization of the nation’s 
telegraph and telephone lines.167 
On December 1, 1913, Postmaster General Burleson’s second annual 
report confirmed these suspicions, revealing that the Post Office had been 
studying the possible acquisition of the telegraph and telephone systems 
since the previous June.168  On December 20, Representative David J.  Lewis 
(D-Md.) introduced a resolution directing the relevant committees to 
consider a bill providing for the postalization of the telephone network.169  
He followed that with an extended defense of the merits of postalizing the 
telephone system that occupied thirty-five pages of the Congressional 
Record.170  A December 23 meeting between Burleson and President Wilson 
left Burleson reluctant to press the issue, suggesting that the Administration 
was not unified in its support of Burleson’s proposal.171 
The debate continued into early 1914.  On January 29, the Senate passed 
a resolution directing the Postmaster General to send the results of his 
investigation to the Senate.172  Burleson complied on January 31, submitting 
a nearly 150-page report laying out the case for government ownership of 
both the telephone and telegraph system173 that apparently drew the support 
of the Navy.174  The House Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads 
would subsequently conduct hearings on “The Postalization of the 
Telephone” on January 15, 1915.175  At these new hearings, Representative 
Lewis made a speech that was quite similar to his speech of December 1913, 
emphasizing the public benefits of government control.176  The only other 
witness at the hearing was an officer of the second largest telegraph company 
 
167. Federal Wires New Wilson Plan: Policy Afoot to Control Nation’s Telephones as Key to 
Government Telegraph, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1913, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=FA0D11F63D5913738DDDAB0894D8415B838DF1D3. 
168. ALBERT S. BURLESON, ANNUAL REPORTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1913, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 63-712, at 16 (2d Sess. 1914). 
169. 51 CONG. REC. 1377 (1913). 
170. Id. at 1377–412. 
171. Lewis Opens Fight for U.S. Telephones, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1913, http://query.nytimes. 
com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0910F63A5813738DDDAA0A94DA415B838DF1D3; accord 
BROOKS, supra note 16, at 149 (noting that “the government advocates of nationalization seemed to 
hang back awaiting their opening”). 
172. Senate Resolution 242 was submitted on January 12 and was initially passed by 
unanimous consent.  51 CONG. REC. 1503 (1914).  The next day, passage of the resolution was 
reconsidered, and the resolution was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.  Id. 
at 1569.  The Committee reported the resolution favorably January 29, and the Senate passed it.  Id. 
at 2503–04. 
173. POSTMASTER GEN., GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF ELECTRICAL MEANS OF 
COMMUNICATION, S. DOC. NO. 63-399 (2d Sess. 1914). 
174. ROSEN, supra note 94, at 21–22. 
175. The Postalization of the Telephone: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Post Office and 
Post Roads on H.R. 20471, 63d Cong. (1915). 
176. Id. at 3–143. 
1004 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:983 
 
who testified in support of postalization in order to curb supposed abuses of 
his chief rival, Western Union.177 
AT&T responded with a vigorous campaign against postalization that 
attempted to stake out a middle ground in favor of a private monopoly 
subject to government regulation.178  Its most extensive statement was a 
thirty-four-page discussion in its annual report on 1913, which asserted “no 
government owned telephone system in the world is giving as cheap and 
efficient service as the American public is getting from all its telephone 
companies.”179  Other prominent examples of AT&T efforts to counter the 
rising sentiment in favor of nationalization include publishing a point-by-
point rebuttal of Representative Lewis’s floor statement,180 public speeches 
made by Vail and other Bell officials,181 as well as language in its annual 
reports.182 
Although Progressives were willing to use the antitrust laws and 
regulation to curb monopolies, they were far more ambivalent about 
government ownership.  Although some commentators have simplistically 
seen Progressivism as favoring nationalization,183 Progressives’ attitudes 
were much more complex.  Specifically, government ownership pitted 
Progressives’ faith in scientific administration and centralized control against 
their intuitive distrust of uncontrolled economic power.184  Wilson’s 
scholarly work placed him in the camp of the government-ownership 
skeptics.  In a book published within two years of his inauguration, Wilson 
argued that, although natural monopolies can harm the public interest, in 
 
177. Id. at 145–56. 
178. Bickers, supra note 17, at 142–44. 
179. AT&T CO., supra note 159, at 28–62. 
180. AT&T CO., GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES: AN 
ANALYSIS (1914), reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES ON GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF TELEGRAPH 
AND TELEPHONE 129–57 (Katharine B. Judson ed., 1914). 
181. Theodore Newton Vail, Some Observations on Modern Tendencies (Oct. 1915), in VIEWS 
ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF THEODORE NEWTON VAIL 
1907–1917, at 240, 258–63 (1917); F.H. Bethell, Some Comment on Government Ownership of 
Telephone Properties (Feb. 25, 1914), reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES ON GOVERNMENT 
OWNERSHIP OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE, supra note 152, at 159. 
182. AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE  STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1915, at 50 
(1916); AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE  STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1916, at 
49–51 (1917). 
183. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 17, at 37 (highlighting the impact the rise of the Progressive 
movement had on proposals to nationalize the telegraph).  See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, HOW 
PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006) (characterizing Progressives as supporters of 
economic nationalism). 
184. Bickers, supra note 17, at 88–89.  On the conflicts within the Progressive movement, see 
HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 215–71 (describing the tension between business monopoly and 
political freedom in an era of increased reliance on government regulation); Michael J. Sandel, 
Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 85 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2076–77 
(1996) (detailing the varied responses among the Progressives to the threat corporate power posed 
to self-government). 
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most cases government ownership would be inferior to government 
regulation.185 
Public reaction was also largely critical of government ownership.  A 
number of scholars criticized the methodology of Burleson’s analysis.186  The 
popular press was largely critical as well, raising concerns about efficiency 
of government operations as well as the potential abuse of patronage.187  
They also denigrated the performance of government-owned telephone 
systems in Europe, with one industry executive quipping, “And as to 
service—Government service would be a joke as compared with present 
service.  If you don’t believe it just try the Government service—telegraph 
and telephone—in Europe.”188 
The imposition of the Kingsbury Commitment in December 1913 
diverted Wilson’s interest in pursuing government ownership.189  Burleson 
maintained a steady drumbeat in support of nationalization in his annual 
reports, focusing some of his energy on the more limited goal of 
nationalizing the telephone systems of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.190  
The Navy did conduct a successful three-day test mobilization during May 
6–8, 1916, during which the Navy used AT&T’s network for all 
communication between all naval facilities and ships.191 
In January and February 1917, the House Committee on the District of 
Columbia conducted extensive hearings on the possibility of the federal 
government taking over the D.C. telephone system, well before the U.S. 
 
185. WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE: ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 
¶¶ 1524–26 (1913). 
186. E.g., A.N. Holcombe, Public Ownership of Telegraphs and Telephones, 28 Q.J. ECON. 
581, 583–86 (1914). 
187. COHEN, supra note 15, at 38; STONE, supra note 3, at 197. 
188. STONE, supra note 3, at 197; see also Wilson Gets Facts on Wire Control, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 1913, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=940CE1DF133FE633A25750C0 
A9669D946296D6CF (citing Vail as saying government help with long-distance service could be 
welcome); C.H. Mackay Derides Federal Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1913, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F40F13F73B5B13738DDDA00994DA415 
B838DF1D3 (projecting that government ownership would result in operating at a loss as it had in 
the English context). 
189. STONE, supra note 3, at 197–98. 
190. See ALBERT S. BURLESON, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1914, H.R. DOC. NO. 63-1387, at 14–16 (3d Sess. 1914) 
(emphasizing that nationalizing the telegraph and telephone systems remained desirable, 
particularly in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico); ALBERT S. BURLESON, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1915, H.R. DOC. NO. 64-358, at 
51–52 (1916) (same); ALBERT S. BURLESON, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1916, H.R. DOC. NO. 64-1728, at 46–48 (1917) (same); 
ALBERT S. BURLESON, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
ENDED JUNE 30, 1917, H.R. DOC. NO. 65-770, at 79 (1918) (reiterating, generally, the claims 
contained in previous reports but omitting the claims regarding Hawaii and Puerto Rico). 
191. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR 1916, H.R. DOC. NO. 64-1480, at 29 (2d Sess. 1917); BROOKS, supra note 16, at 150. 
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entry into World War I on April 6, 1917.192  On March 4, 1918, Burleson 
responded to a Senate request for information with a scathing criticism of the 
telephone service provided in Washington, D.C.193  Ten days later, the House 
Committee on the District of Columbia favorably reported a bill authorizing 
the government takeover of the D.C. phone system.194  Advocates clearly 
regarded the D.C. takeover more as an experiment in a permanent policy than 
a wartime measure.195  Proposals for long-term government control enjoyed 
little support.  Legislation authorizing permanent government operation of 
the entire telephone system submitted in January 1918 by the same 
Representative who would sponsor the successful temporary takeover 
legislation died in committee.196 
II. The History of the Government Takeover 
The federal government’s decision to take control of the U.S. telephone 
system was part of a broader debate over the proper role of the government 
during times of both peace and war.  In reviewing this history, it is important 
to keep in mind that the forces driving the decision both to take the telephone 
system over and to give it back are complex.  Were it simply a matter of 
reflexive support for the state during times of armed conflict, one would 
expect the takeover to have occurred as soon as war was declared, as was 
done with respect to radio.  Instead, Congress waited eight months to take 
over the railroads and another nine months to assume control of the 
telephone system, pointedly declining to take action on an earlier proposal 
until the measure was framed as a prophylactic, emergency measure and the 
President gave it his political support.  Perhaps even more interesting is the 
manner in which the underlying technology and the way that the government 
ran the telephone network influenced the decision to return the wires a year 
later. 
A. Enacting of the Takeover 
The legislation that would lead to the government takeover was 
introduced on June 27, 1918.  The House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce conducted hearings on July 2, at which the only 
witnesses were three government officials who were widely recognized as 
advocates of a permanent takeover: Burleson, Secretary of War Newton 
 
192. Government Monopoly of Telephone Communication in the District of Columbia: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the D.C. on H.R. 18723, 64th Cong. (1917). 
193. ALBERT S. BURLESON, POSTMASTER GENERAL’S STATEMENT, H.R. REP. NO. 65-379, at 
23–27 (2d Sess. 1918). 
194. H.R. REP. NO. 65-379. 
195. STEHMAN, supra note 16, at 177. 
196. H.J. Res. 206, 65th Cong. (1918). 
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Baker, and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.197  The Committee 
issued a report supporting the bill.198  The Senate Committee on Interstate 
Commerce declined to conduct full hearings,199 choosing on July 9 only to 
hear from Western Union President Newcomb Carlton, who testified that he 
saw no necessity that would justify taking over the telegraph system and that 
even if that were to happen, there was even less justification for taking over 
the telephone system.200  He did state publicly that he would prefer a 
government takeover to yielding to unionization.201  No representative from 
AT&T participated in either hearing, although there is some ambiguity about 
whether AT&T actively opposed the measure.202 
The war added a new dimension to the debate over nationalizing the 
telephone system.  On June 28, Burleson wrote to Representative Thetus W. 
Sims (D-Tenn.) that government control was necessary “to prevent 
communications by spies and other public enemies” and “imperative to 
safeguard public interests.”203  Burleson said “paralysis of a large part of the 
system” was threatened, and there were “possible consequences prejudicial 
to our military preparations and other public activities that might prove 
serious or disastrous.”204  Comparing the American response to those of 
European states, Burleson concluded, “We are reminded that there is not a 
nation engaged in the war that [e]ntrusts its military or other communications 
to unofficial agencies.”205  Burleson as well as Secretary of War Baker and 
Secretary of the Navy Daniels all indicated that government ownership was 
 
197. Federal Control of Systems of Communication: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.J. Res. 309, 65th Cong. (1918) [hereinafter 1918 House 
Hearings].  On all three witnesses’ established support for government ownership, see 56 CONG. 
REC. 8717 (1918) (statement of Rep. Martin Madden). 
198. H.R. REP. NO. 65-741 (1918). 
199. Votes 7 to 3 for Wire Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1918, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FB0F17F8355F157A93C2A8178CD85F4C8 
185F9. 
200. 1918 House Hearings, supra note 197, at 7–8, 17.  
201. House Votes Wire Control; Senate Waits, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1918, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00D1FF83C5A11738DDDAF0894DF405 
B888DF1D3. 
202. Some commentators point out that AT&T did not oppose the measure and indicate that “it 
was freely said that President Vail was in favor of government control.”  DANIELIAN, supra note 10, 
at 246.  Company legend holds that Vail went to Wilson in early 1918 and stated, “As long as 
you’ve taken over the railroads, you might as well take us over, too.”  BROOKS, supra note 9, at 
151.  AT&T Vice President Kingsbury later denied that AT&T supported the takeover and said that 
he had attempted to gain admission to both the House and Senate Committee hearings, but was 
denied in both cases.  Return of the Wire Systems: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 421, 66th Cong. 22–23 (1919) [hereinafter Return of the Wire Systems 
Hearings] (statement of Nathan C. Kingsbury, Vice President, American Telephone & Telegraph 
Company). 
203. Letter from A.S. Burleson, Postmaster Gen., to Thetus W. Sims, Chairman, H. Comm. on 
Interstate & Foreign Commerce (June 28, 1918), in 56 CONG. REC. 8719 (1918). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
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needed to prevent government secrets from falling into enemy hands.206  
They also suggested that a strike by telecommunications workers would be 
particularly debilitating to the war effort.207 
Most importantly, President Wilson signaled his support for a temporary 
takeover by sending a letter endorsing Burleson’s arguments in support of the 
bill.208  His support was pivotal.  During the House floor debate, 
Representative Martin B. Madden (R-Ill.) noted the absence of the 
President’s explicit support.209  At the same time, he conceded, “If the 
President says to the House that he wants any power that will enable him to 
successfully conduct the war, there is no man in the House who will not vote 
to give it to him.”210  Supporters of the bill thereupon produced the letter, and 
it passed the House by a vote of 222 to 4.211 
The debate forced supporters of the government takeover to place 
important limitations on the bill.  Although Burleson and Daniels clearly 
harbored ambitions to make the takeover permanent,212 Congress had 
rejected earlier legislation that was not limited to wartime.213  The bill 
carefully avoided this problem by limiting its effect to the duration of the 
war.214  Indeed, the bill’s sponsor, Representative James D. Aswell (D-La.), 
specifically disavowed any intention of making government ownership 
permanent.215 
The absence of any emergency to justify the takeover as well as 
concerns that Burleson might use a wartime measure as a prelude to a more 
permanent takeover of the wires216 led Wilson to assure that the power would 
only be used in case of a telegraph strike and to emphasize the importance of 
 
206. 1918 House Hearings, supra note 197, at 3 (statement of Newton D. Baker, Secretary of 
War), 19 (statement of Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy), 45 (statement of Albert S. 
Burleson, Postmaster General). 
207. Id. at 41 (statement of Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster General). 
208. Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to Thetus W. Sims, House of Representatives 
(June 28, 1918), in 56 CONG. REC. 8718 (1918). 
209. 56 CONG. REC. 8717 (1918) (statement of Rep. Madden). 
210. Id. at 8718. 
211. Id. at 8735. 
212. Burleson stated, “If the efficient management and direction is given the telegraph and 
telephone that has been given the Postal Service, the probability is that they never will be returned 
to private control.”  DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 246; see also Bickers, supra note 17, at 147 
(arguing the advocates of government control viewed it as an experiment for permanent government 
control); MAY, supra note 17, at 31–32, 36–38 (same); STEHMAN, supra note 16, at 177 (same). 
213. See 56 CONG. REC. 8719 (1918) (statement of Rep. Sims) (“[T]he resolution introduced by 
Mr. Aswell in January was not a war-time proposition. . . .  It was not confined to the operation of 
the war, and therefore never considered by the committee.”). 
214. Id. at 8721 (statement of Rep. Esch). 
215. Id. at 8720 (statement of Rep. Aswell). 
216. Id. at 8719 (statement of Rep. Madden) (noting that “[e]verybody knows the Postmaster 
General is a ‘bug’ on Government ownership”). 
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putting such authority in place before it was needed.217  Burleson’s statement 
in support of the proposal was similarly contingent, urging passage of the 
resolution “in order that the President may act, if necessary.”218 
Indeed, the tone of the debate suggested that the authority was a 
prophylactic measure.  Although no exigency currently existed, Congress felt 
that giving the President the authority would allow him to act promptly 
should the need arise.219  Representative Sims, who was the floor manager, 
similarly noted that “this power might be needed at any moment” and that the 
Administration simply asked that “the President be clothed with the power, 
so that he might exercise it if the emergency arose.”220  Aswell emphasized 
that the takeover authority was not permanent,221 as did other members in the 
debate.222 
After a rancorous Senate floor debate223 that forced postponement of a 
planned recess224 and despite several editorials opposing the move,225 
Congress subsequently adopted the resolution, and Wilson signed it into law 
on July 16, 1918.226  The text of the proposal made clear that it was an 
emergency measure.  The takeover was to be exercised only when the 
President “shall deem it necessary for the national security or defense.”227  
Moreover, the statute explicitly provided that the takeover would end with 
the ratification of a peace treaty ending the war.228 
Wilson, however, wasted little time and exercised this power via a 
proclamation on July 22, 1918, that gave the federal government control of 
 
217. President Asks Power to Control All Wire Systems, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1918, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50713FB3C5F15738DDDAB0894DF405B888DF
1D3. 
218. 56 CONG. REC. 8719 (1918) (emphasis added). 
219. Id. at 8716 (statement of Rep. Sims); see also Bickers, supra note 17, at 148–49 
(referencing Representative Sims’s statement concerning the need for Presidential authority if 
exigent circumstances arose). 
220. 56 CONG. REC. 8716 (1918) (statement of Rep. Sims) (emphasis added). 
221. Id. at 8720 (statement of Rep. Aswell) (calling the “fear of permanent Government 
ownership resulting from this legislation . . . ill founded”). 
222. Id. at 8717 (statement of Rep. Sims) (noting that unlike Aswell’s previous proposal, the 
current proposal “continued the control only during the existence of war”). 
223. Id. at 8741–47, 8841–43, 8934, 8937, 8959–62, 9069–78. 
224. Congress Recess Held up by Fight on Wire Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,  
1918, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60C12F63B5F1B7A93C5A9178CD85F4C 
8185F9. 
225. Editorial, Government Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1918, http://query.nytimes.com/ 
gst/abstract.html?res=9A00E7D8173EE433A25755C0A9619C946996D6CF&scp=2&sq=governme
nt+control&st=p; The Unrepresented Public, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1918, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E07E5D7173EE433A25752C1A9619C946996D6
CF. 
226. H.R.J. Res. 309, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 904 (1918). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
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the wires effective July 31.229  In his proclamation, Wilson directed Burleson 
to undertake “the supervision, possession, control and operation of [the] 
telegraph and telephone systems.”230  Wilson assured stock and bondholders 
that their interests would not be jeopardized.  He stated, “Regular dividends 
hitherto declared, and maturing interest upon bonds, debentures, and other 
obligations, may be paid in due course.”231  On November 2, Wilson issued a 
proclamation taking over the submarine cables as well.232  Although 
hostilities ended on November 11, 1918,233 and the Treaty of Versailles 
ending the war was signed on June 28, 1919,234 the government would 
continue to operate the wires until midnight July 31, 1919, just slightly more 
than one year after taking them over. 
B. Running the Telephone System 
The Post Office that took over the telephone system on July 31, 1918 
faced some seemingly insurmountable challenges.235  Most basically, the Post 
Office lacked the experience and administrative capacity to manage a large 
telecommunications network.236  In stark contrast to the takeover of the 
railroads, Congress had failed to provide any detailed guidance as to how the 
system should be run or what the terms of compensation should be.237  
Moving quickly to address his lack of experience running the wires, 
Burleson’s first step was to issue Bulletin No. 1 on July 23 forming a Wire 
Control Board consisting of Burleson, two other members of the post office, 
and David J. Lewis, the once and future Congressman who supported 
nationalization so avidly and who was then serving as a U.S. Tariff 
Commissioner after a failed bid for the Senate.238  Next, on July 29, Burleson 
 
229. President Woodrow Wilson, A Proclamation (July 22, 1918), in 18 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 8551–53. 
230. Id. at 8552. 
231. Id. 
232. President Woodrow Wilson, A Proclamation (Nov. 2, 1918), in 18 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 8630–31. Indications that the 
government may not have taken control of the undersea cables until after hostilities had ended 
provoked accusations that the government’s actions were motivated not by military exigency, but 
rather by a desire to assert permanent control over the wireline communications system.  MAY, 
supra note 17, at 38–42. 
233. MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 157–58 
(2001). 
234. Id. at 485. 
235. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., RETURN OF THE WIRE SYSTEMS, 
ORDER NO. 3380 (July 30, 1919), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND 
OPERATION OF THE TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE AND MARINE CABLE SYSTEMS, AUGUST 1, 1918, TO 
JULY 31, 1919, at 56, 92 (1921). 
236. Bickers, supra note 17, at 151. 
237. See DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 250 (detailing that Postmaster General Burleson relied 
on Bell’s executives in deciding how to operate the wires and how to compensate the companies). 
238. The other members from the Post Office aside from Burleson were John Koons, First 
Assistant Postmaster General, and William Lamar, Solicitor for the Post Office.  U.S. POST OFFICE, 
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summoned Vail to meet with him in Washington, D.C., amid wide 
speculation that the first order of business would be to fire Vail.239  Given the 
breadth of discretion that had been granted to Burleson, Vail felt almost 
entirely at Burleson’s mercy.240  Vail pledged that all of AT&T’s officers and 
employees would do everything in their power to support the war effort.241  
Indeed, Vail regarded it as an opportunity to see what could be accomplished 
when both telephone and telegraph systems were operated by the same 
management.242  Vail was unconcerned with compensation, stating, “You fix 
it, and I’ll be satisfied.”243  
Burleson told Vail’s biographer that he had expected Vail to be “in a 
class with the average railroad president—an autocrat, interested only in the 
success of his road as shown by profits accruing to his stockholders, and also 
largely concerned as to the continuance of his salary.”244  Instead, he quickly 
grew to regard Vail as “a great, unselfish patriot” and “a warm and true 
friend” who “never made a suggestion . . . that was in the slightest degree 
tinged with selfishness and that was not prompted by the highest motive.”245  
Thoroughly disarmed, Burleson reassured Vail that he did not plan to operate 
the telephone system permanently and eventually regarded him as a 
“confidential adviser and counselor in all matters pertaining to the 
telephone.”246 
Given the absence of administrative personnel within the Postal Service 
to run the telephone system, on August 1, Burleson issued Bulletin No. 2 
ordering that “[u]ntil further notice, the telegraph and telephone companies 
shall continue operation in the ordinary course of business through regular 
channels.”247  In addition, “[a]ll officers, operators, and employees of the 
telegraph and telephone companies will continue in the performance of their 
present duties, reporting to the same officers as heretofore and on the same 
 
OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 1, WIRE CONTROL BOARD, ORDER NO. 1744 (July 23, 
1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 61, 61–62. 
239. BROOKS, supra note 16, at 151–52. 
240. Vail reportedly told the two Vice Presidents who were accompanying him: 
Well, I never in my life felt so helpless as I do at this moment.  These people we are 
going up to see have got us entirely in their hands—they have taken our property and 
probably intend to keep it.  They can do what they please with us, and we cannot help 
ourselves.  For once in my life I am completely at sea. 
ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, IN ONE MAN’S LIFE: BEING CHAPTERS FROM THE PERSONAL & 
BUSINESS CAREER OF THEODORE N. VAIL 320 (1921). 
241. Id. at 321. 
242. Id. at 322. 
243. Id. at 323. 
244. Id. at 322. 
245. Id. at 323–24. 
246. Id. at 323. 
247. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 2, ORDER ASSUMING 
POSSESSION AND CONTROL, ORDER NO. 1783 (Aug. 1, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra 
note 235, at 62, 62. 
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terms of employment.”248  Thus, the takeover was more akin to a change in 
management, rather than a change in ownership.  On December 13, Burleson 
gave industry executives an even larger role when he transferred operational 
authority from the Wire Control Board to a new operating board consisting 
entirely of industry executives.249  The operating board was expanded to 
include additional industry executives on January 10 and March 6, 1919.250 
Burleson also effectively ensured that AT&T would do quite well by the 
deal.  On October 5, Burleson approved a contract that was quite generous 
from AT&T’s perspective.  The contract promised to operate the system at 
the same level of efficiency achieved in the past and to maintain the property 
in its current state of repair and gave AT&T the right to inspect the books at 
reasonable times.251  The government agreed to cover all taxes, licensee fees, 
and charges.252  The contract preserved the 4.5% license contract fee that the 
local operating companies had been paying to the Bell System’s long-
distance arm and included a fairly generous depreciation rate of 5.72%.253  
The government also agreed to maintain AT&T’s stock dividend of eight 
dollars per share.254  Finally, the government agreed to hold AT&T harmless 
for any injuries or expenses that were incurred.255  In short, the government 
effectively guaranteed AT&T’s previous rate of return while assuming all of 
the risks of operating the system. 
In addition, the Post Office took several actions that would have a 
lasting impact on the telephone system.  These included ordering the industry 
to resume merging to monopoly, quelling labor unrest, and ordering rate 
increases. 
 
248. Id. 
249. The Board consisted of Union N. Bethell and F.A. Stevenson of AT&T; G.M. Yorke of 
Western Union; and A.F. Adams to represent the independent telephone companies.  U.S. POST 
OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., APPOINTMENT OF OPERATING BOARD, ORDER NO. 2479 
(Dec. 13, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 238, at 74, 74; see also DANIELIAN, 
supra note 17, at 256–57 (describing each man’s corporate affiliations).  It took control on 
January 1, 1919.  U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., OPERATING BOARD TO 
ASSUME OPERATION, ORDER NO. 2534 (Dec. 23, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 
238, at 82, 82 n.3. 
250. Specifically on January 10, the operating board appointed F.B. MacKinnon of the U.S. 
Independent Telephone Association to serve as liaison to the independents.  On March 6, the 
operating board placed N.T. Guernsey (AT&T’s general counsel) in charge of the board’s legal 
department, named Bancroft Gherardi (AT&T’s acting chief engineer) head of the engineering 
department, and designated W.S. Gifford (AT&T’s Comptroller) as head of the accounting 
department.  DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 257. 
251. U.S. POST OFFICE, PROPOSAL FOR COMPENSATION OF ––– TELEPHONE CO. TO THE 
POSTMASTER GENERAL, reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 23, 24–25. 
252. Id. at 26. 
253. DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 252. 
254. Id. at 251. 
255. U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 251, at 23, 25, 28. 
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1. Mandating the Return of Monopoly.—Burleson moved quickly to 
declare the scope of his intentions and his perspective on the future of the 
system.  In Bulletin No. 2 (issued the day after he took over the telephone 
system), Burleson made clear that the purpose of government control was “to 
coordinate and unify these services so that they may be operated as a national 
system.”256 
On August 7, Burleson issued Bulletin No. 3 on “Consolidation of 
Competing Telephone Systems,” which noted, “The Governmental operation 
and control of the telephone systems of the country will undoubtedly cause 
the coordination and consolidation of competing systems wherever 
possible.”257  To encourage the unification of the service, Burleson indicated 
that “negotiations . . . already under way for the consolidation of a number of 
competing telephone systems at the time the Government assumed control” 
would not be disturbed.258  Even where such negotiations were not yet 
underway, Burleson made clear that he had “no objection to the companies 
taking up such negotiations.”259 
Burleson backed up his rhetorical support for consolidation with 
directives to the operators.  Bulletin No. 4, issued on August 15, ordered 
companies “[t]o proceed as expeditiously as possible with the plans 
heretofore instituted for consolidating and unifying the telephone plants and 
properties.”260  In areas where such plans were not yet underway, the Bulletin 
ordered that consolidation plans “should be formulated as soon as 
practicable” wherever consolidation “is manifestly desired by the public” and 
“can be effected on fair terms and in accordance with law.”261  Where two 
competing operators continued to operate, Burleson ordered them to 
“cooperate in making extensions and betterments,” in order to promote 
“unification and the elimination of waste.”262  On the same day, Burleson 
issued another order creating a Committee on Solicitation of Telephone 
Systems consisting of AT&T Vice President Nathan C. Kingsbury and the 
president of one of the independents “for the purpose of making the 
necessary investigations, conducting negotiations, and arriving at agreements 
for the unification and consolidation of the various telephone companies 
 
256. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., supra note 247, at 62, 62. 
257. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 3, CONSOLIDATION OF 
COMPETING TELEPHONE SYSTEMS (Aug. 7, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, 
at 62, 62 (emphasis added). 
258. Id. at 63. 
259. Id.; Office of Information, Post Office Department (Aug. 7, 1918).  Papers of Albert 
Sydney Burleson, Manuscripts Collection, Library of Congress (ASB), Box 21.  
260. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 4, EXTENSIONS AND 
BETTERMENTS CURTAILED, ORDER NO. 1858 (Aug. 15, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, 
supra note 235, at 63, 63. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
1014 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:983 
 
operating in the same communities.”263  In all, Burleson would approve 
thirty-four consolidations of competing telephone operations.264  In addition, 
Burleson deviated from the established principle that the common carriage 
obligation to provide nondiscriminatory service applied only to consumers 
and not to business rivals265 by issuing a Bulletin indicating that he would 
order long-distance companies to interconnect with any requesting local 
telephone companies that did not have long-distance facilities “if upon 
investigation it is found practicable to do so.”266 
Burleson’s advocacy for integration and consolidation extended beyond 
just the telephones.  On November 18, 1918, Burleson ordered that as of 
November 18, all of the telegraph systems “shall hereafter be operated as 
one” and as of December 1, “all telegraph offices shall accept for 
transmission all classes of messages now accepted by any one of them at the 
prescribed tariff rates.”267  The same day, Burleson issued an order taking 
control over the submarine cable system, using the same language contained 
in his order taking over the telephone and telegraph systems, indicating that 
his goal was “to coordinate and unify these services so that they may be 
operated as a national system.”268 
The next day, Burleson stated that an effective communication system 
required “intimate relations under which a continuous circuit can be 
established . . . .  The effectiveness of the service is dependent upon the 
extent of the common control of circuits.”269  Burleson drew support for his 
conclusion from the fact that each of the telegraph systems had its own 
 
263. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., COMMITTEE ON CONSOLIDATION OF 
TELEPHONE SYSTEM, ORDER NO. 1855 (Aug. 15, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 
235, at 63, 63–64. 
264. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER 
GENERAL ON THE SUPERVISION AND OPERATION OF THE TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE, AND CABLE 
PROPERTIES (Oct. 31, 1919), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 5, 11. 
265. The seminal decision is The Express Package Cases, 117 U.S. 1 (1885), in which the 
Supreme Court held that while railroads were obligated to carry passengers, they were not obliged 
to carry business rivals (including express package services), reasoning that railroads were not 
obligated to be a “common carrier of common carriers.”  Id. at 21.  For descriptions of decisions 
extending this principle to telephony and holding that long-distance companies need not 
interconnect with local telephone companies, see HUBER ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.3.1, at 15–16, 
§ 5.1.1, at 407–08; MUELLER, supra note 10, at 48–50.  For an early deviation from this principle, 
see MUELLER, supra note 10, at 116 (citing U.S. Tel. Co. v. Cent. Union Co., 171 F. 130, 143 
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1909)).  
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at 67, 67. 
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235, at 70, 70. 
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269. OFFICE OF INFO., POST OFFICE DEP’T (Nov. 19, 1918), ASB, Box 22. 
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“independent cable systems.”270  Moreover, Burleson pointed to recent 
problems to make his case: 
The recent breakdown in connection with one of the cable systems has 
demonstrated the absolute necessity of being able to utilize at will the 
facilities of either cable system with all of the land line systems, in 
order that traffic may be adjusted in the same hands as it is on the land 
lines.271 
Burleson laid out the multifaceted rationale for these moves in his letter 
of December 4, 1918, ordering Western Union to place its European 
submarine cables under the control of its chief rival, the Commercial Cable 
Company.272  First, there was the notion that the war required greater unity.  
Burleson explained that the “present emergency” demanded “unification in 
operation to the fullest extent possible [of] the cable systems” and that it 
could only be accomplished “through the operation of the two systems under 
one management.”273  Second, and perhaps most importantly, Burleson had a 
fixed set of beliefs about the importance of consolidation.  He envisioned a 
national economy linked by a common communications system.  Burleson 
wrote: 
To do this efficiently and economically requires the combination of 
every kind of electrical transmission of intelligence into one system 
over which the most efficient service could be rendered through the 
development of new and useful services, and the wire plant and other 
facilities being utilized to their fullest extent.274 
The public was demanding “one telephone system,”275 and the only real 
barrier to development was the disunity in the current system.  Burleson 
argued: 
The transmission of speech or electrical continuous signals is now 
practically from every commercial industrial or social community as a 
center, to the limits of effective common control over a continuity of 
circuits.  Any limitations are wholly in the lack of continuity in the 
facilities—not in the “state of the art.”276 
Echoing statements made by defenders of monopoly, Burleson said that 
a long-distance system required “perfect co-ordination which can only come 
from one unified system.”277  Burleson allowed that interconnection could 
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work, but only with a reciprocity equaling “virtual subordination” during the 
time of control by the other system.278 
Burleson’s belief was further underscored by his anger when the 
Commercial Cable Company refused to unify its facilities with Western 
Union’s.  Burleson declared that “the present emergency necessitated the 
unification in operation to the fullest extent possible of the cable systems 
leading from this country to Europe.”279  Indeed, it was manifest that full 
utilization “could only be accomplished through the operation of the two 
systems under one management.”280  Burleson underscored the importance 
that 
the operation of the said cable systems be unified not only for 
improvement of service but also that important economies in operation 
may be effected during the period of Government control which can 
be accomplished only by placing such unified operation under the 
management of persons in complete accord with the ends desired[.]281 
When Mackay refused to interconnect his cables with Western Union’s 
in December 1918, Burleson removed the leadership of the Commercial 
Cable Company from any management role in the marine cable system and 
transferred those responsibilities to Western Union, ordering the president of 
Western Union to “carry into effect directions which have been given for the 
unification of the operation.”282  When the Commercial Cable Company 
continued to resist unification, Burleson removed its officers, board of 
directors, and owners from any supervisory responsibility and placed 
operating board member A.F. Adams in charge of the company.283 
Burleson backed up such strong measures with broad statements 
evincing his support for consolidation.  For example, Burleson’s belief in 
unification was trumpeted in his first report.  He sought to promote “the 
coordination and unification of all service rendered by [the telephone and 
telegraph] properties” by promoting “consolidations for the purpose of 
getting rid of pernicious competition and wasteful operation” as well as 
through “a general standardization of rates and rules of operation.”284  These 
statements reflected Burleson’s belief in the “potential economies under a 
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national system of telegraphs and telephones, provided such a system were 
brought under an efficient and intelligent management.”285  Based in part on 
the “[i]nterchange in the use of wires,” such a system was “further illustrated 
by the steps taken for the consolidation of competing properties.”286 
In this regard, Burleson’s vision of the telephone network was 
remarkably similar to Vail’s.287  Both clearly thought that the telephone 
system should consist of a single system under unitary control.  During the 
government takeover, Burleson had the opportunity to put that vision into 
practice, not merely through gradual consolidation of the industry, but 
through executive fiat. 
2. Labor Unrest.—Despite (or perhaps due to) his best efforts, Burleson 
never shook the labor troubles that he inherited when the Post Office took 
over the wires.  Even before taking over the wires, Burleson’s testimony 
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce had 
already put him on record as stating his belief that if the government were to 
take over the telegraph and telephone systems, their employees “should not 
be affiliated with any outside organization; that their sole allegiance and 
loyalty should be to the Government, and that no outside organization should 
have a voice in shaping their action.”288  Apparently Burleson thought that 
“outside organizations” included unions.289 
The mutual dislike between Burleson and the labor movement served as 
the backdrop for Burleson’s attempts to accommodate the wage demands of 
the telephone and telegraph operators.  In an attempt to buy some time, 
Burleson appointed a committee on September 14, 1918, to “investigate the 
working conditions of and wages paid to employees of the telegraph and 
telephone companies, and report as to what improvements, if any, should be 
made in the working conditions, the wages which should be paid the various 
classes of employees, and the feasibility of standardizing the same.”290  The 
committee consisted of Union N. Bethell of AT&T; F.B. MacKinnon of the 
United States Independent Telephone Association; William S. Ryan, 
Assistant Superintendent, Division of Post Office Service; John B. Colpoys, 
Special Agent of the Department of Labor, and Julia S. O’Connor, 
“representing the organized telephone workers of the country.”291 
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Shortly after the Committee’s appointment, Burleson issued a bulletin 
attempting to dispel widespread rumors “that it is the desire of the 
Government that employees of the telegraph and telephone companies should 
join the Commercial Telegraphers’ Union, the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, or other unions.”292  Burleson averred that “[t]hese 
representations have no foundation in fact whatever” and “the Post Office 
Department will not distinguish between nonunion and union employees.”293 
The conflict boiled over the following April, and a large strike swept 
portions of New England.294  Not surprisingly, Burleson took a hard line 
against the strikers.  He released a statement on April 16, 1919, saying that 
the government could not authorize wage increases “merely upon demand 
from the employees.  A strike on the part of employees working for the 
Government is not permissible.”295  On April 19, Burleson telegraphed 
President Wilson to explain the situation.  Seeing strikes against the 
government as entirely illegitimate, he wrote, “To yield means for the 
Government to surrender to a strike demand without an opportunity to pass 
on the question whether it is a just demand. . . .  To do this in my opinion 
would be a fatal mistake and will result in multiplying and aggravating these 
troubles.”296 
On the actual economics involved, Burleson was convinced that 
settlement on the terms that the union demanded would be cost prohibitive to 
AT&T and the independent operators.  To support his position, he 
telegraphed President Wilson the results of a study that he had 
commissioned.  According to Burleson, if the union’s demands in Boston 
were applied to all operators nationwide, “it would increase operating 
expenses of Bell Company alone by nearly forty million dollars and 
Independents by nearly twelve million dollars.”297  Government control had 
not, as some advocates had hoped, quieted or resolved the labor issues in the 
industry.  The demands and frustrations of the operators and the cost issues 
remained the same as when the wires were under private control.  The most 
salient difference was simply that labor now found itself in open conflict 
with the government, as the owner of the system and ostensibly representing 
the interests of all, rather than with executives, representing the interests of 
 
Wires, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1919, at 8, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/ 
pdf?res=F20C1FFA3C5E157A93C5A8178DD85F4D8185F9. 
292. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 9, EMPLOYEES JOINING 
UNIONS, ORDER NO. 2067 (Oct. 2, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 66, 66. 
293. Id. 
294. Telephone Strike Ties Up 5 States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1919, at 1, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=FB0615FA395C1B728DDDAF0994DC405B898DF1D3. 
295. OFFICE OF INFO., POST OFFICE DEP’T (April 16, 1919), ASB, Box 23. 
296. Telegram from Albert Sydney Burleson to President Woodrow Wilson 5 (Apr. 16, 1919) 
ASB, Box 23. 
297. Telegram from Albert Sydney Burleson to Woodrow Wilson (undated, circa Apr. 19, 
1919), ASB, Box 23.  
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shareholders.  The result was one that neither labor nor the Wilson 
Administration had sought: continuing labor conflict in a context in which 
the government’s interests in containing costs conflicted with the wage 
increases being demanded. 
3. Rate Increases.—As noted earlier, the government takeover left Vail 
with the helpless feeling of being unable to control the financial health of his 
company.  Indeed, Vail confided in Western Union President Newcomb 
Carlton that he feared that the government takeover would make it 
impossible for him to raise the capital needed to continue expanding.298  
Carlton soothed Vail, replying, “It’s your salvation.  The government will be 
able to raise your rates and get you new money.”299 
Carlton’s words would turn out to be prophetic.  On August 28, 1918, 
just four weeks after assuming control, Burleson issued Bulletin No. 5 
authorizing telephone companies to begin charging installation fees, which 
had been one of AT&T’s longstanding goals.300  The size of the charge 
varied with the cost of service: the installation fee was $5 when the monthly 
rate was $2 or less, $10 when the monthly rate was between $2 and $4, and 
$15 when the monthly rate was more than $4.301  Burleson said that the 
charge was due “to the necessity for conserving labor and material.”302  In his 
final report on running the wires, Burleson indicated that wartime shortages 
made it “essential that the telephone companies . . . curtail their normal 
expenditures for extensions and temporarily arrest the normal development 
of their business.”303  As such, these fees had “no reference to the cost of 
installation.”304  Instead, their “prime purpose . . . was military in character, 
to be justified as a war measure and not as the expression of a commercial 
purpose.”305  A few weeks after the fees were enacted, Burleson began to 
refer to them as “service connection charges” and provided that changes of 
name where no lapse of service occurs and relocations of equipment within 
the same premises would result in a charge of $3.00.306 
On November 18, Burleson concluded that the end of “the necessity for 
conserving labor and material” associated with the cessation of hostilities 
 
298. OSLIN, supra note 16, at 278. 
299. Id. 
300. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 5, SERVICE CONNECTION 
CHARGES, ORDER NO. 1931 (Aug. 28, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 64, 
64; see also AT&T CO., 1911 ANNUAL REPORT 10–11 (1912) (explaining that installations paid for 
by the company represent a “large expenditure” that is “a burden not only on the capital but on the 
net revenue of the telephone, from which other service companies are free”). 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., supra note 264, at 5, 12. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 8, SERVICE CONNECTION 
CHARGES (Sept. 14, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 65, 65–66. 
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justified revising the service connection charge in line with “the average cost 
of the initial expense of establishing service for new subscribers.”307  
Consequently, he reduced the charge for new installations to $3.50.308  As 
Burleson indicated in his final report, while the initial schedule of charges 
“must be regarded as a war measure,” the revised schedule “rests on 
commercial considerations” and “a sound commercial principle” and now 
“must be regarded as one item in the unified and standardized system of 
telephone charges.”309 
On December 13, 1918, after persistent lobbying by Vail, Burleson also 
authorized a 20% increase in long-distance rates effective January 21, 1919, 
which augmented AT&T’s revenues by roughly $10 million.310  He justified 
the rate increase in part by the abnormal economic conditions brought about 
by the war.311  In addition, “[t]he purpose of the new schedule of telephone 
toll rates is to standardize the long distance service throughout the country 
and to establish uniform charges.”312  Burleson lamented the 
interconnectivity problems that variations in rates had caused and cast 
standardization as a program to include all Americans in the 
telecommunications system: “Under the toll rates now established, the toll 
service is an intercommunity, interstate, and interregional service, available 
to all Americans, at all times, everywhere.”313 
The order raising long-distance rates also called for a fifty percent 
reduction between the hours of 8:30 p.m. and midnight as well as a seventy-
five percent reduction in rates between midnight and 4:30 a.m.314  The final 
report indicated that night rates were the application of a business principle 
 
307. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 15, MODIFIED SERVICE 
CONNECTION CHARGES, ORDER NO. 2352 (Nov. 18, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra 
note 235, at 68, 68. 
308. Id. at 69. 
309. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., supra note 264, at 5, 13. 
310. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 22, TOLL RATE SCHEDULE, 
ORDER NO. 2495 (Dec. 13, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 75, 77; 
DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 256. 
311. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., supra note 264, at 5, 14. 
312. OFFICE OF INFO., POST OFFICE DEP’T (Feb. 6, 1919), ASB, Box 22. 
313. Id.  One of the other service changes was the addition of person-to-person calling that 
precluded charges when the particular person being called could not be located.  Id. 
314. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., supra note 264, at 78.  This followed a 
similar order imposing reduced telegraphy rates for “night messages.”  U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE 
OF POSTMASTER GEN., BULL. NO. 17, TELEGRAPH RATES ON “NIGHT MESSAGES”, ORDER NO. 
2354 (Nov. 18, 1918), reprinted in U.S. POST OFFICE, supra note 235, at 70, 70.  The night message 
would be transmitted to a receiving station which would transcribe the message and then place the 
message in the regular mail.  Burleson explained the importance of this service: “A very great 
increase of traffic between distant points is expected to result from this low rate.  A letter may take 
four or five days with no alternative but the payment of one dollar.  This gives the alternative of 
one-half dollar service, and brings together the distant parts of the country about three days closer 
together.”  OFFICE OF INFO., POST OFFICE DEP’T (Nov. 19, 1918), ASB, Box 22. 
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developed in the context of the telegraph that was both “simple and of 
universal recognition”315: 
It recognizes the fact that the facilities of any industry must provide 
for carrying the maximum business load, and that if this load can be 
distributed over the 24 hours of each day, a larger amount of business 
can be carried on with relatively less investment than if the business 
done is crowded into relatively few hours of each day.316 
In short, Burleson recognized that telecommunications networks must 
be sized according to the peaks in traffic and engaged in an early example of 
traffic shaping through peak-load pricing in an attempt to increase the 
efficiency of the network and to reduce the cost of service. 
On March 19, 1919, Burleson also approved an increase in local rates 
recommended by the operating board.317  Together these rate increases 
totaled roughly $50 million.318  Unsurprisingly, these rate increases were 
quite unpopular with consumers.  In April, Burleson sought to address 
criticisms by releasing data showing that the proposed rate increase was more 
modest than the overall rate of wartime inflation: 
The increase of 20% in telegraph rates should be considered in 
comparison with the 100% increase in other prices, and it is less than 
that found necessary to add to the railroad freight rates and is no 
greater than has been made generally in other public utility rates, in 
order to obviate financial collapse.319 
Burleson further explained that despite being required to carry 
unprofitable business, e.g., government communications, the Post Office had 
not been able to reduce the price paid for the materials involved.320  The 
problem also included the expansion of the system into rural underserved 
areas.  As Burleson explained: 
The extension of the telegraph service into fields that are less 
profitable than are the great business centers, and the handling of 
Government business claimed by both companies to be at a loss of 
50% of the operating cost, are a charge upon the gross revenues which 
is escaped by a company which avoids the rendering of this necessary 
public service.321 
These rate increases engendered public anger, as one of the primary 
rationales for government ownership had been that the absence of desire for 
 
315. U.S. POST OFFICE, OFFICE OF POSTMASTER GEN., supra note 264, at 5, 14. 
316. Id. at 14. 
317. Letter from Albert Burleson, Postmaster Gen., to U. N. Bethell, Chairman, U.S. Telegraph 
and Telephone Administration’s Operating Board (Mar. 19, 1919), quoted in DANIELIAN, supra 
note 17, at 258. 
318. DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 260. 
319. OFFICE OF INFO., POST OFFICE DEP’T 1 (Apr. 12, 1919), ASB, Box 23.  
320. Id. at 2. 
321. Id. at 1. 
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profit would lead to lower rates.322  Burleson’s decision to increase local rates 
also antagonized state regulatory agencies, which successfully obtained 
injunctions against $16 million of the rate increases in ten states across the 
country.323  The Supreme Court overturned these injunctions in Dakota 
Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota,324 which was argued on May 5–6, 
1919, and decided on June 2, 1919.325  Writing for an 8–1 majority, Justice 
White held that the war power was complete and sufficient to uphold 
Congress’s decision to take over a public utility.326  Moreover, the state 
police power did not require that the judiciary carve out realms of state 
prerogative.327  In other words, Congress’s authority over the 
telecommunications system under the War Power was complete and included 
the ability to set rates for intrastate services.328 
Despite the rate increases, the telephone system still operated at a 
substantial loss, which under the terms of the agreement the government had 
to make good.329  As such, the government owed AT&T a deficiency 
payment of $13 million, although AT&T forgave $4 million of it “to 
facilitate prompt and economical settlement.”330  The Treasury allocated an 
additional $4 million to compensate the independents.331 
C. Returning the Wires 
On December 13, 1918, Chairman John Moon (D-Tenn.) of the House 
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads introduced a proposal directing 
the Postmaster General “to negotiate contracts for the purchase of any or all 
telephone lines . . . subject to the approval of Congress.”332  The House 
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads reviewed the bill in January 
1919 in a series of hearings.333  On January 29, the Committee issued a report 
entitled “Extension of Government Control of Telegraph and Telephones.”334  
While the report indicated that “many of the committee desired a longer time 
 
322. COHEN, supra note 15, at 38. 
323. DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 260–62. 
324. 250 U.S. 163 (1919). 
325. Id. at 163. 
326. Id. at 183.  Justice Brandeis dissented without opinion.  Id. at 188. 
327. Id. at 185–87. 
328. Id. at 187. 
329. DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 268. 
330. Id. (citation omitted). 
331. See id. at 268–69 (noting that the bill to the Treasury totaled just over $13 million after 
totaling the $9 million paid to AT&T and the payments due to telegraph and independent telephone 
companies). 
332. H.R.J. Res. 368, 65th Cong. (1918), reprinted in Government Control of the Telegraph 
and Telephone Systems: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 368 Before the H. Comm. on the Post Office and 
Post Roads, 65th Cong., pt. 1, at 3 (1919). 
333. Government Control of the Telegraph and Telephone Systems: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 
368 Before the H. Comm. on the Post Office and Post Roads, 65th Cong., pts. I–III (1919). 
334. H.R. REP. NO. 65-1012 (3d Sess. 1919). 
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for extension of Government control of telegraph and telephone lines, the 
majority are of the opinion that the lines should be returned to the owners on 
December 31, 1919.”335 
On May 19, Vail and the President of the United States Independent 
Telephone Association sent a letter to Congress requesting the return of their 
telephone properties.336  The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce 
conducted hearings on May 29,337 while the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce conducted hearings on May 30–31 and June 4–5.338 
By this time, government ownership had lost many of its key 
constituencies.  The Supreme Court had just handed down its decision 
upholding the local rate increase on June 2, much to the dismay of the state 
regulatory commissions and consumers.339  Labor tensions were brewing that 
would culminate in the second telegraph operators’ strike on June 11, and the 
unions were frustrated by the fact that government ownership appeared to 
hurt their bargaining position.340  The armistice had been in place for over 
half a year, and the negotiations that would culminate in the June 28 signing 
of the Treaty of Versailles were approaching their conclusion.341  The change 
in the political winds is well illustrated by the titles of the hearings.  Unlike 
the January hearings, which referred to “Extension of Government Control,” 
the hearings of late May and early June spoke of the “Relinquishment” and 
the “Return” of the telephone system.342 
After the war, the public emergency rationale for government ownership 
of the wires ceased.  Public hostility to the rate increases and labor strife had 
dogged the period of government control.343  Government operation 
continued to be dogged by accusations of widespread censorship.344  In this 
context, Congress held hearings before the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce on whether to return the wires in June 1919.345  The 
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WORKER MILITANCY, 1827–1923, at 200–01, 207–08 (1990) (describing a strike called by the 
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companies launched a full-fledged lobbying effort to convince Congress to 
relinquish control.346  Burleson fought in vain to hold back the tide.  He 
wanted the wires to stay under government control, although “at lower 
rates.”347 
Representative John J. Esch (R-Wis.) presided over the hearings, and 
they began with consideration of a written statement by Burleson.348  
Burleson argued that private control would not solve the basic problem that 
the government had faced during the war: increased costs of materials and 
labor.  He wrote, “The extraordinary increased cost of operation and 
maintenance which has been fastened on [the telephone and telegraph 
operators] as a result of the war will continue for some time after control 
passes from the Government.”349  Burleson remained adamant that “the 
various systems should be coordinated as to operation.”350  Monopoly was 
not necessary to maximize efficiency, but consolidation was necessary to 
avoid “wasteful competition and the economic loss occasioned by 
duplication of plant and force.”351  In order to facilitate this consolidation, 
Burleson recommended that Congress enact a law allowing any 
telecommunications company to “purchase the property of any telegraph or 
telephone company, or any part thereof, or consolidate with any other 
telegraph or telephone company, or pool its traffic and facilities with any 
other telegraph or telephone company,” subject to the approval of the ICC.352  
Burleson recognized that if government ownership was going to end, then the 
best that he could hope for was that Congress would encourage consolidation 
of the industry via relaxation of the antitrust regulatory scheme. 
State regulators did not necessarily share Burleson’s belief in 
consolidation.  For instance, Carl D. Jackson, chairman of the Railroad 
Commission of Wisconsin, which oversaw telecommunications in the state, 
testified that Congress simply needed to return the wires to private control, 
rather than encouraging consolidation via additional legislation.353  Jackson 
explained that the problem of duplication, and attendant waste, was 
nonexistent in his state because Wisconsin prohibited duplication and 
required interconnection.354  Although Wisconsin had approximately one 
thousand independent operators and diverse rates, costs were low and the 
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technology in use was adequate to cover present needs.355  He disagreed with 
Burleson’s belief in uniform rates, stating that urban service cost more than 
rural service due to the increased need for central stations in dense areas.356  
Jackson explained that in a city like Milwaukee, density actually drove up 
costs because of the expenses related to operating central stations.357  If 
Wisconsin moved to a uniform rate, then it could unfairly hurt rural 
customers.358  Jackson declared, “Such a thing as a uniform postage-stamp 
rate for telephone service throughout the United States is unthinkable.”359  
And, on the general question of return of the wires, Jackson was clearly in 
favor of the resumption of private control.360 
Also at issue in the hearings was why the rates had gone up during the 
war.  There were lingering suspicions that nationalization, in and of itself, 
had driven up costs.361  Nathan Kingsbury, Vice President of AT&T, took a 
different approach and testified that costs had skyrocketed during the war 
years for three reasons.362  First, wages had increased approximately 50% 
during the war years, AT&T’s payroll rising from $110 million in 1915 to 
$175 million in 1919.363  Second, the price of copper had increased by 100% 
in 1917 over the cost in 1914, although it had dropped some in the most 
recent years.364  The cost of lead-covered cable increased 45%, the cost of in-
house manufactured goods increased 25%, and the cost of purchased 
manufactured goods increased 75%.365  Third, the cost of capital had also 
increased.  Prewar, capital was relatively cheap and AT&T’s credit was 
good; during the war, interest rates for AT&T had risen 2%, with capital only 
being available at close to 7%.366  Kingsbury explained that this was a 
particular hardship on telephone companies because they had constant need 
for new capital.  He stated, “You have got to keep on building all the time 
every day.”367  Every new phone required, on average, a $150 capital 
investment, and AT&T installed 168,000 new phones in the first quarter of 
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1919.368  Considering the entire situation, Kingsbury explained, “Up to the 
time we went to war in 1917 it had been possible to get along without large 
increases in revenue” via increases in efficiency.369  Now, AT&T needed rate 
increases to keep up with rising costs.370 
Considering the effect of government control during the war, Kingsbury 
stated that Burleson had not interfered in the operations of AT&T.371  
Nationalization caused a small loss of morale and increased pressure on 
wages.372  Recasting the rationale for Burleson’s connection charge, 
Kingsbury stated that rather than it being a subsidy for rural development, 
“the principal purpose” of the charge was to depress demand during the war 
years given the material shortages.373  Kingsbury’s explanation of why the 
government lost money during the takeover was simply “[b]ecause it could 
not get the rates up as soon as the expenses went up.”374  Pressed on this 
point by Congressman Edward L. Hamilton (R-Mich.), Kingsbury reiterated 
that the failure of the rates to adjust quickly to increased costs during the war 
was “the whole story” of why the government lost money.375 
F.B. MacKinnon, vice president of the U.S. Independent Telephone 
Association, also believed that the wires should be returned, and he agreed 
with Kingsbury on the need for remedial legislation.376  MacKinnon, like 
Kingsbury, blamed any deterioration of service on war shortages.377  
Specifically, he blamed the “general labor conditions, scarcity of labor, and 
inability to hold operators.”378 
Joseph P. Hayes, National President of the Association of Western 
Union Employees, also encouraged Congress to return the wires.379  The 
unions resented that they had lost ground on wages during Burleson’s tenure, 
and they sought to return the wires to private control so that they could better 
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pressure the companies for wage increases.380  Hayes reported that his 
members were eager to end government control, stating, “I find that our 
people, the workers, as a whole throughout the country, unlike the railroad 
workers, are very much committed to private control.”381 
John C. Koons, First Assistant Postmaster General, represented the 
Administration at the end of the hearings.382  Koons stated that he was not 
opposed to the return of the wires, and he recognized the need for some 
remedial legislation.383  Koons sought to deflect blame for the perceived 
deterioration in service during the takeover.  He stated that service had 
suffered because the telephone companies “had released thousands of people 
for service in the Army.  Hundreds of their very best men were in the 
Army.”384  Seeking to counter Kingsbury’s explanation of the connection 
charge, Koons said that the primary rationale was to take the burden of 
installations off of those that did not change lines.385  Koons said that some 
businesses moved frequently, and thus steady subscribers subsidized those 
moves.386  He explained, “So we fixed an installation charge in order to take 
the burden off of the subscribers who did not make changes and ought not to 
be made to bear the cost, and also in order to reduce the demand for 
extensions and installations.  We had to do it.”387 
Rounding out the hearing was the statement of J.A. Pratt, representing 
the United Telephone Company of the State of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin 
State Telephone Association.388  Pratt decried the takeover, and was blunt 
about its effect, “I do not believe anything in the last 12 years of the history 
of regulation in the State of Wisconsin has done more to weaken in the minds 
of the people of that State the theory of regulation than the acts of the Post 
Office Department.”389  For Pratt, the takeover had eroded citizen confidence 
not just in publicly owned telecommunications, but also in regulation 
generally. 
 
380. See id. at 74–75 (stating that Sunday pay had been reduced from time-and-a-half basis to 
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Considering the hearings as a whole, the voices for retaining 
government control were few.390  AT&T, the independent operators, the state 
regulators, and the operators’ unions all wanted the wires returned to private 
control.  AT&T wanted to return to its business plan, which included 
continued expansion and gradual rate increases approved by state 
commissions.391  Federal control chafed the independent operators, and they 
too, like AT&T, wanted to get back to their prewar business plans.392  The 
state regulators had been stripped of their power to set rates while the wires 
were under government control by the just announced Dakota Central 
decision on June 2, 1919.393  Not surprisingly, they yearned for the prewar 
system in which they exercised influence by setting state-by-state rates.394  
The unions, having been stymied by Burleson and the issues surrounding 
striking against the government during the war, also sought return to private 
control.395  All that stood on the other side was a diffuse set of ideas about the 
inefficiencies of a competitive and private decentralized system.  Burleson, 
overwhelmed by the negative impression of his tenure, could not hold onto 
the wires. 
On June 4, the Senate Committee issued a report entitled “Return of 
Telephone, Telegraph, and Cable Lines” that proposed setting the outer limit 
of the return of the wires at sixty days after the bill’s enactment.396  On 
June 16, the House Committee issued a report entitled “To Repeal the 
Telephone and Telegraph Act” that would require the restoration of the wires 
at midnight on the last day of the calendar month the bill was signed into 
law.397  Both chambers adopted the House’s language on June 27,398 and the 
President signed the legislation into law on July 11.399  Per the terms of the 
statute, the telephone system left government control at midnight on 
 
390. Considering what would have happened to AT&T had the government not nationalized the 
wire, Kingsbury stated, “If the companies had continued to be managed by their owners, we would 
have been diligently at work during all that time on these rate matters.”  Id. at 152. 
391. See id. at 18 (statement of Nathan Kingsbury, Vice President, AT&T) (discussing AT&T’s 
plans for expansion and rate increases prior to government take over). 
392. See, e.g., id. at 10 (stating that independent operators in Wisconsin see “nothing relating to 
Government control since the Government has taken possession of the telephone companies which 
has appealed to the patrons of the telephone companies”). 
393. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919). 
394. Charles M. Elmquist, President and General Solicitor of the National Association of 
Railway and Utility Commissioners, testified during the congressional hearing on returning the 
wires that state commissions set rates in forty-five states at that time.  Return of the Wire Sytems 
Hearings, supra note 202, at 163. 
395. See id. at 74 (statement of Joseph P. Hayes, National President, Association of Western 
Union Employees) (“I find that our people, the workers, as a whole throughout the country, unlike 
the railroad workers, are very much committed to private control.”). 
396. S. REP. NO. 66-4, at 1 (1919). 
397. H.R. REP. NO. 66-45, at 2 (1919). 
398. 58 CONG. REC. 1906–07, 1924–25 (1919). 
399. Act of July 11, 1919, ch. 10, 41 Stat. 157. 
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July 31.400  The act provided that the rate increases that Burleson had 
approved would continue in force for up to four months.401 
In the end, a number of factors brought the nation’s experiment with a 
publicly owned telephone system to an end.  As an initial matter, assurances 
that the initial proposal was only temporary placed a natural limit on the 
prospects for extending the period of government ownership.  Indeed, 
Burleson continued to be dogged by accusations of trying to make the 
arrangement permanent.402  The rate hikes that Burleson had authorized were 
intensely unpopular.  Representative Aswell, the sponsor of the original 
legislation, said, “I owe it to my people and to Congress to apologize for my 
resolution if government control means increase in rates.”403  Burleson’s 
decisions had alienated key constituencies, such as the labor unions and the 
state regulatory authorities, not to mention the consumers that had hoped for 
less expensive service.404  And both legislators and the public had the strong 
sense that the network had been poorly run by the government.405 
After signing the order returning the wires to private control,406 
Burleson wrote a personal letter of thanks to Theodore Vail, then Chairman 
of the Board of Directors of AT&T.407  Reflecting on this period, Burleson 
wrote “to express [his] heartfelt appreciation” for Vail’s assistance.408  
Burleson praised Vail’s unselfishness, and hoped that the future of the wire 
service would involve “the same successful control and direction” which it 
had received under Vail’s administration.409  Wishing Vail “many years of 
health and happiness,” Burleson signed off, “[y]our sincere friend,” and an 
exceptional experiment in American telecommunications came to an end.410 
AT&T emerged from this period in decent shape.  Rates were raised and 
standardized.411 The state regulatory commissions had been prevented from 
 
400. Id. 
401. Id. 
402. See 58 CONG. REC. 1347 (1919) (reporting debate over the government’s authority to 
control the wire systems and change rates). 
403. The First Step, TELEPHONY, Apr. 19, 1919, at 11. 
404. E.g., Burleson Rapped on All Sides, FOURTH EST., May 10, 1919, at 15, 15–16; 
Kenneth N. Bickers, Transformations in the Governance of the American Telecommunications 
Industry, in GOVERNANCE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 77, 90 (John L. Campbell et al. eds., 
1991); JOHN, supra note 17, at 403; MAY, supra note 17, at 50. 
405. See, e.g., 58 CONG. REC. 1347 (1919) (decrying the inefficiency of the wire systems under 
government control); Representative Aswell Apologizes, 43 AM. ECONOMIST 235, 235 (1919) 
(attacking the government’s “experiment[ing] at the expense of the public” by seizing the wires and 
reporting widespread opposition to the same). 
406. OFFICE OF INFO., POST OFFICE DEP’T, ORDER 3380 (July 30, 1919), ASB, Box 24. 
407. Letter from Albert Sydney Burleson to Theodore N. Vail, AT&T (July 30, 1919), ASB, 
Box 24. 
408. Id. 
409. Id. 
410. Id. 
411. BROOKS, supra note 16, at 158–59. 
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blocking national rate increases.412  New universal service charges were 
added that subsidized development, and AT&T was permitted to retain its 
long-desired service connection charge despite the fact that it was justified as 
a war measure.413  The unpopularity of the rate hikes and the labor troubles 
blunted calls for nationalization.414  The Republican Party platform of 1920 
was able to crow that we “took from the incompetent Democratic 
administration the administration of the telegraph and telephone lines of the 
country and returned them to private ownership.”415  Proposals to revive 
government ownership of the telephone system would continue to appear 
throughout the 1920s, but none were able to garner any substantial support.416  
Indeed, the nation’s unhappy experience with government control of the 
telephone system is widely regarded as the death knell for calls for 
government ownership of telecommunications.417 
III. Implications of the Government Takeover 
The government takeover yields new insight into several key questions 
of telecommunications policy.  First, it provides a new view of the reasons 
that the telephone network collapsed into a monopoly.  Second, it provides a 
new perspective on the origins of universal service.  Third, it adds a new 
twist to the development of state–federal relations.  Fourth, it sheds new light 
on the proper scope of government intervention by identifying characteristics 
that are well and poorly suited to governmental control. 
A. The Reemergence of Monopoly 
One of the historical puzzles concerning the early telephone industry is 
how AT&T was able to reestablish its monopoly.  By 1907, AT&T’s market 
share had dropped below 50%.418  And yet, the Bell System’s market share 
had reached 80% by 1934.419  Commentators typically attribute the 
 
412. Bickers, supra note 404, at 90–91. 
413. BROOKS, supra note 16, at 157–58. 
414. See id. at 158 (discussing opposition to nationalization); COHEN, supra note 15, at 38 
(noting opposition to rate increases brought about by nationalization); Bickers, supra note 17, at 
152–54 (explaining why labor troubles in part made lowering rates infeasible and detailing 
objections to these rate increases). 
415. Republican Platform of 1920, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840–1972, supra note 
41, at 232. 
416. Cox & Byrnes, supra note 15, at 30 n.39. 
417. JOHN, supra note 17, at 405 (“The failure of ‘postalization’ legitimated the ownership and 
operation of the telephone, telegraph, and cable by private corporations that would become a 
hallmark of managerial capitalism and a defining feature of the twentieth-century American 
political economy.  Never again in the twentieth century would government ownership of the 
telephone and the telegraph occupy so prominent a place on the national political agenda.”); MAY, 
supra note 17, at 54 (calling “the most lasting effect” of the takeover “was to discredit the principle 
of state socialism”). 
418. COHEN, supra note 15, at 27. 
419. BROCK, supra note 15, at 177. 
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reestablishment of monopoly to one of two causes.  First, they suggest that 
the presence of scale economies or network economic effects rendered 
telephony a natural monopoly.420  Second, they argue that the reemergence of 
monopoly is the result of the unwillingness of antitrust authorities to curb 
Theodore Vail’s ambitions.421  A close look at the history of the government 
takeover and the data that it generated reveals that neither factor was 
decisive.  Instead, industry consolidation was directly influenced by 
deliberate government policy. 
1. Natural Monopoly.—One possible explanation for the reemergence 
of Bell dominance is that the telephone network is a natural monopoly.  
Indeed, many distinguished observers regard this as uncontroversial.422  
Natural monopoly is believed to be the result of the supply-side scale 
economies associated with constantly declining costs or the demand-side 
scale economies associated with network economic effects.  The 
circumstances surrounding the takeover make clear that neither provides a 
convincing explanation. 
a. Scale Economies.—The most frequently cited explanation for the 
reemergence of monopoly is the economies of scale associated with high 
fixed costs.423  The presence of unexhausted economies of scale causes unit 
costs to decline as volume increases.424  When average costs decline, the firm 
with the largest volume can underprice its rivals, which causes it to take even 
more share of the market.  If the economies of scale remain unexhausted, 
markets that begin as competitive will collapse into natural monopolies. 
A revisionist history has emerged pointing out that telephone service 
was not a declining cost industry.  In particular, when switching was 
performed manually by operators sitting at a switchboard, it did not scale.425  
The deployment of mechanical switches would eventually change this 
limitation, but AT&T did not begin deploying mechanical switches until the 
 
420. Weiman & Levin, supra note 142, at 104. 
421. See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 143–45 (discussing Vail’s view of regulation and the 
government’s initial nonregulation of telephone rates). 
422. See, e.g., FAULHABER, supra note 6, at 107 (“Indeed, until the late 1960s few questioned 
that the telephone industry was a natural monopoly.”); HUBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 86 (“Is the 
telephone industry (or any part of it) a natural monopoly?  Until the 1960s, the answer was 
generally presumed to be yes, from end to end.”); 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 787c, at 366 (3d ed. 2008) (“Until the 1960s or 1970s long 
distance telephone connections between local exchanges in the United States were considered as 
much a natural monopoly as the local exchanges themselves.”). 
423. Cf. BROOKS, supra note 16, at 133–34 (outlining how AT&T’s economies of scale 
advantage allowed it to buy up competitors and work towards a monopoly); JEFFREY CHURCH & 
ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 55 (2000) (identifying long-run fixed costs as a source 
of economies of scale). 
424. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 423, at 54. 
425. Milton Mueller, The Switchboard Problem: Scale, Signaling, and Organization in Manual 
Telephone Switching, 1877–1897, 30 TECH. & CULTURE 534, 559 (1989). 
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1920s.426  Both AT&T and its competitors found a need to request rate 
increases as their operations grew.427 
Interestingly, contemporary observers recognized the absence of scale 
economies in the telephone industry.428  Indeed, Nathan Kingsbury made 
precisely this point in his testimony regarding the return of the wire systems.  
Kingsbury stated that installation cost more in the cities than in the rural 
areas because of the need for additional central switching stations.429  Each 
central station could only take about 10,000 lines, and as a city grew, AT&T 
was forced to install new central stations, with new trunk lines between those 
stations.430  Trunk lines were exceedingly expensive.431  Moreover, as the 
central stations grew in a city, the company was required to employ 
additional inter-operator connectors.432  While automatic switches could 
overcome some of these issues, the costs of installing new trunk lines 
between new central stations could not be ameliorated.433  Summing up this 
situation, Kingsbury stated, “The profit per unit decreases as the number of 
units increases.”434 
Interestingly, the takeover provided data in which the diseconomies of 
scale were apparent.  In 1916, the government collected data on the 
operations of telephone systems,435 apparently to assist it with the 
management of these companies.436  Plotting cost per telephone against the 
 
426. E.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 76-340, at 261 (1939); A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN 
THE BELL SYSTEM: THE EARLY YEARS (1875–1925), at 552–53, 611–12 (M.D. Fagen ed., 1975); 
ROBERT J. CHAPUIS, 100 YEARS OF TELEPHONE SWITCHING (1878–1978), at 249 (1982); Joan Nix 
& David Gabel, The Introduction of Automatic Switching into the Bell System: Market Versus 
Institutional Influences, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 737, 738 (1996). 
427. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 36–37; see also Weiman & Levin, supra note 142, at 104 
(discussing AT&T’s growth and the increasing costs that ensued). 
428. E.g., J. MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 321 (1923) 
(“Telephone companies . . . show no signs of economy with increased size, but rather the 
opposite.”). 
429. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 41. 
430. Kingsbury said, “[A]s the city grows it is necessary to install a larger and larger number of 
central offices because a girl’s arm is just so long, and as the manual switchboards are constructed 
she can only reach about 10,000 stations with her arm.”  1919 House Hearings, supra note 338, at 
31 (statement of Nathan Kingsbury, Vice President, AT&T). 
431. Id. 
432. Id. at 32. 
433. See Return of the Wire Systems Hearings, supra note 202, at 35 (describing technology 
that eliminated the 10,000-line limit but still required trunk lines). 
434. Id. at 30.  “The difficulty is that the larger the number of units you serve in the telephone 
business, under conditions that exist requiring a larger and larger investment per unit, a larger and 
larger operating cost per unit, that larger investment and larger cost goes up so fast that the larger 
the number of units you serve, the more it costs per unit to serve them.”  Id. 
435. Memorandum from Bureau of Statistics, Interstate Commerce Comm’n on Tel. Cos. & 
Tel. Cos. Reporting to the Interstate Commerce Comm’n for the Calendar Year 1916 (Aug. 20, 
1918) available at 
http://archive.org/details/TelephoneAndTelegraphCompaniesReportingToTheIccFor1916. 
436. Douglas Galbi, Early U.S. Telephone Industry Data, GALBITHINK.ORG, 
http://www.galbithink.org/telcos/early-telephone-data.htm. 
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number of subscribers reveals a clear upward trend, suggesting the presence 
of diseconomies of scale rather than scale economies. 
 
Figure 1.   Cost Scaling Among U.S. Telephone Companies in 1916 
 
Source: Douglas Galbi, Dis-Economies in Communications Networks, PURPLE MOTES 
(Apr. 25, 2010), http://purplemotes.net/2010/04/25/economies-and-dis-economies-in-
communications-networks/. 
 
Telephone companies facing increasing costs found themselves 
constantly having to ask municipal regulators to approve rate increases.437  
This was particularly difficult for the independents who offered the benefits 
of cheaper rates as the principal reason for being allowed to enter.438 
b. Network Economic Effects.—Dominant positions are also often 
attributed to another economic concept known as network economic effects.  
Network economic effects exist when the value of a network increases with 
the number of subscribers.439  To use a classic example, consumers during 
the 1980s who were choosing between the two leading videocassette recorder 
(VCR) formats (Sony Betamax and VHS) did not really care about their 
 
437. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 66. 
438. Id. at 37. 
439. DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 4 
(2009). 
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technical capabilities.440  What determined the value is which format the 
majority of other VCR owners would adopt.441  The telephone system is 
regarded as a paradigmatic example of a network that exhibits network 
economic effects.442  As AT&T noted in its 1901 Annual Report: 
That the system be complete and of the greatest utility, it is necessary 
that as many persons as possible should be connected to it as to be 
able to talk or be talked to by telephone. . . .  [The user’s] advantage as 
a telephone subscriber is largely measured by the number of persons 
with whom he may be put in communication.443 
AT&T similarly observed in its 1908 Annual Report, “A telephone—
without a connection at the other end of the line—is . . . one of the most 
useless things in the world.  Its value depends on the connection with the 
other telephone—and increases with the number of connections.”444 
Network economic effects can give large companies a competitive 
advantage.  The fact that larger networks are more valuable provides strong 
incentives for new customers to opt for the larger network.445  This in turn 
makes the largest network still larger, further reinforcing its competitive 
advantage.446  This advantage can come from having more local 
subscribers.447  The market leader could ensure that it alone enjoyed those 
advantages simply by refusing to interconnect with the other network.448  
 
440. See Hiroshi Ohashi, The Role of Network Effects in the US VCR Market, 1978–1986, 12 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 447, 449 (2003) (explaining that improvements in Beta’s product 
quality were not enough to overcome network effects). 
441. Id. at 448. 
442. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 179, 223 n.139 (collecting authorities). 
443. Ithiel de Sola Pool et al., Foresight and Hindsight: The Case of the Telephone, in THE 
SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE TELEPHONE 127, 131 (Ithiel de Sola Pool ed., 1977) (ellipsis and alteration 
in original) (quoting AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE 
& TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE  STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1901, at 
6 (1902)). 
444. AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE  STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1908, at 21 
(1909). 
445. Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001). 
446. Id. at 8–9. 
447. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 1041, 1046 n.19 (1996) (recognizing network effects in phone service and noting that phone 
companies were originally successful as local-only providers); MUELLER, supra note 10, at 72–73 
(noting that demand for long-distance service was initially very low). 
448. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 445, at 8; see also BROOKS, supra note 16, at 114 
(describing how Bell’s policy against interconnection gave it a competitive advantage over 
independents).  But see LIPARTITO, supra note 14, at 250 n.4 (“The notion that Bell’s refusal to 
interconnect was a potent competitive weapon is an article of faith in telephone literature.”). 
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Alternatively, others have suggested that greater reach made possible by 
AT&T’s key long-distance patents made its network more desirable.449 
Looking at only the national numbers, arguments that AT&T’s overall 
size gave it a strategic advantage are hard to reconcile with the fact that in 
1907, the independents controlled more subscribers than did AT&T.450  The 
independents could thus nullify whatever advantages AT&T enjoyed simply 
by interconnecting with one another.451  That said, national numbers are 
somewhat misleading in that subscribers during the World War I era made 
almost exclusively local calls.452  What mattered, then, was the percentage of 
customers that any particular company controlled locally, not nationally.  
Although AT&T continued to enjoy a strong position in the northeast and 
mid-Atlantic states, the independents were the market leaders in the 
Midwest.453  The independents were also stronger in small towns and rural 
communities that AT&T had neglected.454  In those areas, local network 
economic effects would have favored the independents, not AT&T.455  The 
fact that AT&T also lost market share in markets which it entered first 
further cuts against network economic effects as a source of competitive 
advantage.456 
Moreover, it is recognized that customer heterogeneity can ameliorate 
network economic effects.457  If subscribers place a higher value on a small 
subset of people, what matters is not the total number of people who 
subscribe, but rather whether the people most important to that subscriber 
join the network.458  When this is the case, different groups can segregate into 
 
449. BROCK, supra note 15, at 119; FAULHABER, supra note 14, at 3; John V. Langdale, The 
Growth of Long-Distance Telephony in the Bell System: 1875–1907, 4 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 145, 
155 (1978). 
450. See Langdale, supra note 449, at 152 (providing a breakdown of 1907 phone ownership). 
451. See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United 
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 292 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. 
White eds., 1989) (noting that the independents were able to effectively compete by 
interconnecting). 
452. See Robert MacDougall, The People’s Telephone: The Political Culture of Independent 
Telephony, 1 BUS. & ECON. HIST. ONLINE 1, 13 (2003), www.thebhc.org/publications/ 
BEHonline/2003/MacDougall.pdf (remarking that even as late as 1930, less than half of 1% of all 
telephone calls crossed state lines). 
453. Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the 
United States, 1876–1917, 3 J. POL. HIST. 42, 49 (1991). 
454. Id. at 48. 
455. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 59, 62. 
456. Cohen, supra note 453, at 49. 
457. See Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147, 
1151–53 (2012) (noting that increased heterogeneity can work to counterbalance certain network 
effects); SPULBER & YOO, supra note 439, at 140 (“[N]etwork externalities may be substantially 
mitigated if user preferences are nonuniform.”). 
458. See Bob Briscoe et al., Metcalfe’s Law Is Wrong: Communications Networks Increase in 
Value as They Add Members—But by How Much? The Devil Is in the Details, IEEE SPECTRUM, 
July 2006, at 34, 37 (pointing out that different connections within a network have different values). 
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different networks without any significant loss in value.459  What little loss 
remains can be substantially ameliorated if gateways exist between the 
networks.460 
As Milton Mueller has pointed out, this is precisely what occurred in the 
early telephone network.461  “Classes and neighborhoods divided themselves 
into user communities.”462  When they needed to call the other network, they 
had easy access to bridge technologies, such as payphones or free phones 
maintained by drugstores and saloons to attract business.463  Perhaps the best 
evidence that network economic effects did not give AT&T any advantage in 
local markets is the fact that the independents expressed little interest in 
interconnecting with AT&T.464  Clearly, the independents did not see their 
inability to reach a larger number of customers as a competitive 
disadvantage. 
All of these considerations undercut the suggestion that AT&T was able 
to use network economic effects in local telephone markets to restore its 
dominance.  But what about long distance?  As an initial matter, interstate 
long-distance calling represented a trivially small fraction of overall 
telephone revenues.465  As one customer noted in 1909, truly long-distance 
telephoning was “of little commercial or social importance.”466 
 
459. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of 
Market Failure?, in 17 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 18–19 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & 
William Kovacic eds., 1995) (describing two scenarios where a network increases in value not only 
by increasing the sheer number of users, but also by increasing the desirability of communication 
between those users). 
460. Yoo, supra note 457, at 1153–54. 
461. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 20–29. 
462. Id. at 85; see also MacDougall, supra note 452, at 13 (describing the choice between 
AT&T’s extensive network and an independent’s intensive network was often one that divided 
along class lines). 
463. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 82, 85; see also BROCK, supra note 15, at 110 (observing that 
there was often not much to be gained in the first place by connecting telephone networks with each 
other). 
464. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 10, 51, 78–79; Gabel, supra note 138, at 353–54. 
465. See MUELLER, supra note 10, at 72–73 & n.50 (noting that “[t]he demand for telephone 
connections between points over 200 miles apart was still restricted to a tiny minority of users” and 
citing an AT&T report from 1900 that 98% of calls placed from cities and 95% of calls placed from 
small towns were to points within 50 miles); MacDougall, supra note 462, at 13 n.46 (citing a 1905 
statement by an Independent that 98% of all long-distance calls were placed to points within a one 
hundred-mile radius).  For later statements to the same effect, see Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 
U.S. 133, 147 (1930) (reporting that interstate calls constituted 0.5% of all telephone traffic); 
Hearings on S. 6 Before the Comm’n. on Commc’ns of the H. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 71st 
Cong. 1565, 1585–86 (1930) (statement of Joseph B. Eastman, Comm’r, Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n) (reporting that interstate traffic represented 0.47% of all exchange calls and 0.46% of 
total exchange revenue and that if exchange and toll calls were combined, intrastate traffic 
represented 1.36% of all calls and 9.9% of revenue). 
466. Gansey R. Johnson, Telephone Combination: Would It Serve a Good Purpose?, 
TELEPHONY, Jan. 2, 1909, at 5, 7. 
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What little long distance traffic existed tended to be regional.467 In 
regional long distance, AT&T enjoyed no technological advantage, as both 
the independents and the Bell System simply connected adjacent 
exchanges.468  Indeed, AT&T President Frederick Fish was forced to concede 
in 1903 that the company held “no controlling patents on long distance 
telephone apparatus or systems” and that “long distance lines of some 
commercial value [could] be constructed and operated by anyone.”469 
Moreover, AT&T had focused most of its attention on connecting 
distant points.470  The skeletal pattern that resulted made AT&T weaker with 
respect to short-haul long distance.471  The independents’ focus on intensive 
coverage of smaller areas put them in a stronger position.472  In the words of 
the president of one independent, his company “has the near long distance 
points, the Bell [has] the far-off.”473  Between the two, it was the near-long-
distance points that mattered more.474 
It is thus hard to see how either scale economies or network economic 
effects could have been the means through which AT&T reestablished its 
monopoly.  The answer must lie elsewhere. 
2. The Supposedly Lax Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws.—Other 
commentators attribute the reemergence of monopoly to a failure of antitrust 
enforcement in two ways.  First, some assert that government intervention 
occurred after AT&T had reestablished its monopoly position and that the 
authorities should have forced AT&T to divest its newly acquired 
properties.475  Second, some argue that antitrust authorities implemented the 
Kingsbury Commitment in a way that permitted the Bell System to continue 
to merge to monopoly.476  Specifically, the Commitment did not prevent 
AT&T from acquiring independent local telephone companies with which 
they did not directly compete.477  Many scholars have claimed that the 
 
467. See MUELLER, supra note 10, 72–73 (noting that “[n]o more than 5 percent of all 
telephone calls were to points more than fifty miles away” and that “the real source of competitive 
advantage was comprehensive coverage of a particular region corresponding to the interest of the 
majority of telephone users”). 
468. Id. 
469. Id. at 72 n.49. 
470. See id. at 73 (noting that prior to 1894 Bell pursued the long-distance market “to the 
exclusion of most others” and that “[t]he new emphasis on intensive toll line development within 
the licensee companies’ territories was actually a sharp departure from the old Bell vision”). 
471. Id. at 73, 90. 
472. See MacDougall, supra note 462, at 11–12 (arguing that AT&T “regarded its long lines as 
a major competitive weapon” but that “middle distance connections became a key competitive 
weapon for the independents”). 
473. FREDERICK S. DICKSON, TELEPHONE INVESTMENTS AND OTHERS 41 (1905). 
474. Id. 
475. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
476. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
477. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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antitrust authorities allowed mergers of competitive companies so long as the 
transaction involved a swap of lines.478 
Claims that the Kingsbury Commitment arrived too late are belied by 
the fact that the independents still controlled 45% of the national market at 
the time of the settlement,479 leaving AT&T’s share well below the threshold 
needed to constitute a monopoly.480  Moreover, as noted above, regional 
share mattered more than national share, and in many regions, independents 
still enjoyed majority positions.481  Had the Kingsbury Commitment simply 
stabilized the industry structure that existed in 1913, it would not have 
inevitably collapsed back into monopoly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
478. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
479. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970 (pt. 2) 783 (Bicentennial ed. 1975); see also COHEN, supra note 15, at 27 (stating 
that AT&T’s market share “dipped below 50 percent”); MUELLER, supra note 10, at 133 (noting 
that at the time of the agreement dual service remained in 13% of all communities with exchanges 
in the United States); Krishna P. Jayaker & Harmeet Sawhney, Universal Service: Beyond 
Established Practice to Possibility Space, 28 TELECOMM. POL’Y 339 (2004) (noting that 
“significant market share remained with the independents until 1921, when the Willis-Graham Act 
again permitted the Bell System to acquire non-affiliated companies”) ; Steve G. Parsons & James 
Bixby, Universal Services in the United States: A Focus on Mobile Communications, 62 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 119, 125 (arguing that independents maintained significant market share until 1921). 
480. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (expressing 
doubts that 60% to 64% market share would be enough to constitute a monopoly in the aluminum 
market). 
481. See supra notes 453–54, 472 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2.   Telephone Lines Purchased and Sold by the Bell System,  
1912–1921 
 
Source: FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REPORT ON CONTROL OF TELEPHONE 
COMMUNICATIONS: CONTROL OF INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE COMPANIES 42 tbl.v 
(1937). 
 
The suggestion that the Kingsbury Commitment did nothing to slow 
AT&T’s acquisition strategy is also belied by the facts.  As Figure 2 shows, 
the three years following the imposition of the Kingsbury Commitment saw a 
sharp drop in the number of lines acquired by the Bell System.  Had AT&T 
been simply allowed to swap lines with its competitors, its acquisition 
numbers would have remained high and been counterbalanced by an equal 
number of lines acquired by the independents.  Yet this is not the pattern 
observed following 1913.  The fact that the number of lines acquired by the 
Bell System dropped in 1913, 1914, 1915, and 1916 suggests that the 
Kingsbury Commitment was effective in slowing AT&T’s acquisition policy 
for at least three years. 
3. Government-Mandated Consolidation as a Missing Consideration.—
The biggest factor missing from the explanation of the reestablishment of the 
Bell System is the government takeover during World War I.  As noted 
above, industry consolidation was one of Burleson’s central policies during 
the takeover.  Consequently, acquisitions spiked in 1918, only to drop off 
again in 1919 and 1920 after the return of the wires until the Willis-Graham 
Act completely abrogated antitrust review of telecommunications mergers in 
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1921.482  From this explanation, monopoly was not the sole result of the 
antitrust authorities’ refusal to curb the corporate ambitions of Theodore 
Vail.  Instead of being asleep at the switch, the government was one of the 
primary drivers of the return to monopoly. 
There is one aspect of the data that does not completely fit this story: the 
upsurge in Bell acquisitions in 1917.483  The impetus for this change came 
not from Bell, but rather from the independents.  Having finished the build 
out of the areas that Bell had ignored, independents found that further 
revenue growth required going head-to-head with Bell.484  Intensive 
competition is much more expensive and less profitable than an extensive 
race for the market.485  Faced with the prospects of vigorous competition, 
many independents began to explore reaching some form of accommodation. 
In 1915, the independents appointed a committee to explore 
consolidating into the Bell System.486  It was this committee that proposed 
complying with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Kingsbury Commitment by 
“permit[ting] the acquisition by the Bell System of Independent properties by 
means of a division of territory, so long as in such a division the Bell System 
should not acquire more property or territory than it relinquished.”487  This 
solution “would conform to the probable spirit” of the Kingsbury 
Commitment “by continuing the prohibition on the expansion of the Bell 
System at the expense of competition” while still allowing a division of 
territory.488  The Justice Department effectively accepted this modification in 
1917.489 
The critical support for the reemergence of mergers in 1917 thus came 
from the independents, who also provided the impetus for the Willis-Graham 
Act’s abolition for all antitrust scrutiny of telecommunications mergers.490  
 
482. See supra Figure 2. 
483. See Bickers, supra note 17, at 126–27 (remarking on the increase in consolidations of 
telephone companies during this time). 
484. See MUELLER, supra note 10, at 55–60 (discussing phases of expansion employed by 
independents). 
485. Christopher S. Yoo, Product Life Cycle Theory and the Maturation of the Internet, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 641, 646–47, 666–67 (2010). 
486. Bickers, supra note 17, at 123–24. 
487. Letter from H.D. Critchfield, Sales Dep’t, Automatic Electric Co., to F.H. Woods 2 
(May 18, 1915), quoted in Bickers, supra note 17, at 125. 
488. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
489. Bickers, supra note 17, at 126; CHARLES A. PLEASANCE, THE SPIRIT OF INDEPENDENT 
TELEPHONY 86 (1989); see also H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (noting that the 
Kingsbury Commitment was generally understood to repent acquisition of competing telephone 
companies until after January 1918, when it became generally understood that it was not a violation 
of The Kingsbury Commitment for the Bell System to acquire competing telephone stations, if at 
the same time the Bell System sold an equal or comparable number of Bell-owned stations to an 
independent). 
490. 61 CONG. REC. 1983 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Winslow) (“The bill was brought to the 
attention of the committee by . . . the so-called independent telephone companies of the United 
States. . . .  [T]hey have represented to the committee . . . that if the opportunity to sell or 
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Consolidation enjoyed the support of key consumer groups who needed both 
services and did not want to pay for two subscriptions.491  This fact makes it 
difficult to lay this development at the feet of Theodore Vail.  The fact that 
both competitors and consumers endorsed the change makes it hard to 
characterize it as government capitulation to a monopolist, as antitrust 
enforcement authorities find it difficult to oppose mergers when neither 
competitors nor consumers object. 
This was particularly so in the case of telephony, which as noted above 
is largely intrastate in character.492  Because federal jurisdiction extended 
only to interstate matters, mergers between two local telephone companies 
were arguably beyond the Justice Department’s jurisdictional reach.493  That 
is why on September 7, 1914, when authorizing AT&T’s acquisition of a 
competing local telephone company in Spokane, Washington, the Justice 
Department announced that the Kingsbury Commitment was not meant to 
prevent communities from eliminating dual service if they so chose.494  
Similarly, on December 7, 1914 (less than a year after the issuance of the 
Kingsbury Commitment), the Report of the Attorney General noted that the 
settlement “does not mean that where there are two telephone systems in a 
city or town there never can be a consolidation into a single system.”495  On 
the contrary, it “leaves local communities generally free to have one 
telephone system, if they desire,” so long as the resulting consolidated 
company maintained all previous long-distance interconnections.496  If 
sufficient local political support existed for the merger, the Justice 
Department would be hard pressed to oppose it.497 
In any event, all of these dynamics were soon rendered moot by the 
government takeover, as Burleson condoned and accelerated the process of 
industry consolidation.498  The strength of the Postmaster General’s 
convictions rendered the views of both AT&T and the independents 
irrelevant.  Even if it was not the only factor, Burleson’s relentless support 
 
consolidate is not afforded to them they are liable to go through the condition of bankruptcy . . . .”); 
see also Bickers, supra note 17, at 127; Gabel, supra note 138, at 353 (“[T]he independents joined 
Bell in seeking passage of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, which permitted the merger or 
consolidation of competing telephone companies.”); Robinson, supra note 14, at 8 (“[T]he 
independents joined AT&T in supporting a lifting of restrictions on AT&T acquisitions.”). 
491. COHEN, supra note 15, at 33; MUELLER, supra note 10, at 140–44; Gabel, supra note 138, 
at 348; Weiman & Levin, supra note 142, at 122, 124. 
492. See supra notes 465–73 and accompanying text. 
493. STONE, supra note 3, at 193. 
494. United States v. AT&T Co., No. 6082 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 1914) (order modifying decree), 
reprinted in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST CASES, JULY 2, 1890–
JANUARY 1, 1918, at 497, 497–99 (Roger Shale ed., 1918). 
495. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 14 (1914). 
496. Id. 
497. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 133–34. 
498. STONE, supra note 3, at 199; VIETOR, supra note 16, at 172–73. 
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for industry consolidation has been largely overlooked as one of the reasons 
for AT&T’s return to dominance.499 
B. The Origins of Universal Service 
A vibrant debate has emerged over the origins of universal service.  The 
conventional wisdom argues that universal service was the result of AT&T’s 
commitment to broad geographic coverage, exemplified by AT&T’s 
endorsement of “‘One System,’ ‘One Policy,’ ‘Universal Service.’”500  
Critics of this position suggest that the concept of universal service is more 
modern, being the product of AT&T’s attempt to justify the continuation of 
its monopoly when facing the emergence of competition during the 1960s 
and 1970s.501  Richard John has offered an intriguing third interpretation, 
arguing that universal service represents Theodore Vail’s attempt to emulate 
the postal system, influenced by his experience running the Railway Mail 
System in between his stints at AT&T.502 
There can be no question that AT&T endorsed the idea of providing 
telephone service to all Americans.  For example, its 1907 Annual Report 
intoned that the “‘universality’” that was the Bell System’s strength “carries 
with it . . . the obligation to occupy and develop the whole field,” including 
semi-urban and rural areas as well as urban areas.503  Its 1910 Annual Report 
affirmed the company’s “belie[f] that some sort of connection with the 
telephone system should be within the reach of all” and that the telephone 
network would ultimately become a medium for all electronic 
 
499. Only a handful of works acknowledge Burleson’s role, and those that do offer no more 
than a few words.  See H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., (1939) (devoting a single sentence to the 
government’s conscious policy of “caus[ing] the coordination and consolidation of competing 
systems wherever possible”); FISCHER, supra note 15, at 50 (devoting a single sentence to how “the 
wartime experience of coordination between AT&T and the independents accelerated the 
unification of the industry”); HUBER ET AL., supra note 14, § 4.4.1, at 354 (“During World War I, 
from 1918 to 1919, the Postmaster General took over operation of the telephone industry and . . . 
directed the competing local systems to consolidate into a single national network.”); MUELLER, 
supra note 10, at 133 (making a passing reference to “World War I-induced centralization”); 
VIETOR, supra note 16, at 172–73 (devoting a single sentence to how government control “ran 
squarely up against the Justice Department’s prohibition on consolidation of competing exchanges,” 
as Burleson “sought to eliminate competition and integrate operations wherever possible”); Peters, 
supra note 15, at 257 (noting Burleson’s view that “government operation and control of the 
telephone system ‘would undoubtedly cause the coordination and consolidation of competing 
systems wherever possible’”). 
500. AT&T CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AT&T COMPANY TO THE 
STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1909, at 18 (1910); see Pool et al., supra 
note 444, at 131 (“[T]he goal of universality, which became one of the watchwords of the Bell 
system, was there from the beginning.”). 
501. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 150–52; see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD 
WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE? 6–8 (2000) (explaining that although the 
phrase was first used by Theodore Vail, the company “revived the notion of universal service” with 
a “new definition” in response to competition during the 1960s and 1970s). 
502. JOHN, supra note 17, at 388; Richard R. John, Theodore N. Vail and the Civic Origins of 
Universal Service, 28 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 71, 76–79 (1999). 
503. AT&T, supra note 146, at 28. 
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communications “from every one in every place to every one in every other 
place, a system as universal and as extensive as the highway system of the 
country which extends from every man’s door to every other man’s door.”504 
Critics such as Milton Mueller have dismissed these statements as 
nothing more than an “oratorical jab.”505  It was not until the independents 
forced AT&T’s hand that the company began to live up to the promise of its 
earlier rhetoric.506  Instead, they regard universal service as an invention of 
the late 1960s and 1970s to justify the continuation of the Bell monopoly.507  
The primary mechanism was to use the process of separations to allocate a 
higher proportion of network elements used both for local and long-distance 
service, such as the loop and the switch, to long-distance rates.508  The effect 
was to overcharge for long-distance service in order to cross subsidize local 
service.509  This process did not begin until the 1950s and did not reach full 
stride until the late 1960s and 1970s.510 
While it is true that long distance–local cross subsidies did not emerge 
until later in the history, it was only one of several cross subsidies built into 
telephone rates.  Another key cross subsidy takes advantage of the fact that 
the higher density makes providing service less costly in urban areas than 
rural areas.511  Using rate averaging to impose a uniform price effectively 
permits rates paid by urban users to cross subsidize those paid by rural 
users.512 
Although these scholars are correct that the long distance–local cross 
subsidy did not emerge until the 1960s and 1970s, the urban–rural cross 
subsidy associated with rate averaging was well established in the postal 
service before World War I.513  The takeover allowed this postal concept to 
become a staple of telephone policy as well.514  In the words of one 
commentator: 
During this period of government ownership, the decision was made 
to set standard long-distance rates throughout the country, based on 
average costs.  In other words, subscribers calling from large cities 
would pay above costs in order to provide a subsidy to those in rural 
areas.  So, early in the century cross-subsidization began, embraced by 
the industry, which rarely question the premise behind the 
 
504. Id. at 23. 
505. MUELLER, supra note 10, at 100. 
506. Id. at 101–03. 
507. Id. at 151–52. 
508. Id. at 151–55. 
509. Id. at 159. 
510. Id. at 160–61. 
511. Thierer, supra note 16, at 277. 
512. Id. at 276–77. 
513. JOHN, supra note 17, at 379; John, supra note 502, at 75–76. 
514. 52 CONG. REC. 849 (1915) (statement of Rep. David Lewis); POSTMASTER GEN., supra 
note 26, at 10; JOHN, supra note 17, at 379, 387. 
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arrangement that the ability to communicate with subsidized 
subscribers was of value to the subsidizing subscribers.515 
Following the war, the state public utility commissions would follow 
the federal government’s example when setting local rates.516  By the 1920s, 
statewide rate averaging had become a standard feature of the regulatory 
landscape.517 
So John’s suggestion that the postal model of universal service provided 
an early influence on universal service policy in the telephone industry 
appears to be well taken, but with a somewhat different twist.  As noted 
above, John believed that the mechanism through which these concepts were 
incorporated into telecommunications policy was Vail’s experience with the 
Railway Mail Service.518  While John is correct about the influence of the 
postal system on telephone rates, Vail’s experiences were reinforced by a 
much more direct mechanism: Rate averaging was imposed on the telephone 
system by the Postmaster General himself. 
C. Federal–State Relations 
The government takeover during World War I also had a profound 
influence on federal–state relations.  Burleson’s order to raise and 
standardize national rates was met with immediate resistance from state 
regulatory agencies who sought to enjoin the rate increases.519  Injunctions 
were granted in ten states across the country, from Florida to Pennsylvania to 
South Dakota.520  AT&T’s general counsel, N.T. Guernsey worked with Post 
Office Solicitor William Lamar to get a test case quickly to the Supreme 
Court.521  In March, the South Dakota Supreme Court enjoined the Dakota 
Central Telephone Company from raising rates.522  Guernsey convinced 
Lamar to fight the injunction, and Lamar obtained approval from the 
Attorney General to challenge the ruling.523  As Danielian describes it, “Thus 
the United States Attorney General’s office, the Post Office Department, and 
the Bell System were mobilized, hand in hand, to defend the Postmaster 
General’s order for increased Bell telephone rates.”524 
 
515. 1 LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION 
AND ORGANIZATION 81 (1987), quoted in Thierer, supra note 16, at 276. 
516. Thierer, supra note 16, at 277. 
517. VIETOR, supra note 16, at  173–74; Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies that Changed 
the Telephone Industries into Regulated Monopolies, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 171, 188–89 (1987). 
518. See supra note 502 and accompanying text. 
519. DANIELIAN, supra note 17, at 260. 
520. Id. at 262. 
521. Id. 
522. Id. 
523. Id. at 263. 
524. Id. 
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The case of Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota was argued 
on May 5–6, 1919, and decided on June 2, 1919.525  As noted earlier, the 
Supreme Court upheld the rate increases by a vote of 8–1.526  The Court 
depicted the issue as similar to the one recently resolved in Northern Pacific 
Railway Co. v. North Dakota,527 where the Court upheld the federal 
government’s ability to set intrastate railroad rates under Congress’s war 
power.528  In the case at bar, Justice White saw the same principle at work: 
Congress could lawfully take over a public utility under its war power,529 and 
state police power did not create protected enclaves of state prerogative.530  
Justice White wrote: 
Conceding that it was within the power of Congress, subject to 
constitutional limitations, to transplant the state power as to intrastate 
rates into a sphere where it, Congress, had complete control over 
telephone lines because it had taken possession of them and was 
operating them as a governmental agency, it must follow that, in such 
sphere there would be nothing upon which the state power could be 
exerted except upon the power of the United States, that is, its 
authority to fix rates for the services which it was rendering through 
its governmental agencies.531 
Accordingly, the Court overruled the injunction and Burleson’s rate 
hikes were upheld.532  The victory ended up being somewhat pyrrhic.  
Frustration with the rate increases approved by the Court led the states to 
lend their support to returning the wires to private control as quickly as 
possible.533  Moreover, the Supreme Court would subsequently curb federal 
power in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.534 by denying the ICC the 
authority to affect intrastate rates.535  Instead, the states would bear that 
responsibility after the cost of any assets used for both interstate and 
intrastate service was apportioned between the two services.536  This 
movement culminated with the inclusion of a provision in the 
Communications Act of 1934 disavowing any FCC jurisdiction over 
 
525. 250 U.S. 163 (1919). 
526. See supra notes 326–28 and accompanying text. 
527. 250 U.S. 135 (1919). 
528. Id. at 151–52. 
529. Dakota Cent. Tel., 205 U.S. at 183–84. 
530. Id. at 187. 
531. Id. 
532. As May notes, the Court’s decisions occurred after “the experiments were marked for 
extinction,” and thus the Court may have felt less need to become involved with the issues.  MAY, 
supra note 17, at 57. 
533. Bickers, supra note 17, at 154–55. 
534. 282 U.S. 133 (1930). 
535. Id. at 159–60. 
536. Id. at 148–49. 
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“charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in 
connection with intrastate communication service.”537 
A comparison with how similar issues were resolved in railroading 
illustrates the strength and influence of state opposition to federal power 
mobilized by Burleson’s ham-fisted policies.538  When confronted with a 
similar issue with respect to railroads in The Shreveport Rate Case,539 the 
Court held that the ICC had jurisdiction over interstate rates as well as “all 
matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that 
the control is essential or appropriate” to the security and efficiency of 
interstate service.540  The Court further concluded, “The fact that carriers are 
instruments of intrastate commerce, as well as of interstate commerce, does 
not derogate from the complete and paramount authority of Congress over 
the latter.”541  In short, “[w]herever the interstate and intrastate transactions 
of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control 
of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the 
final and dominant rule.”542  The Court reaffirmed “the principle that 
Congress in the exercise of its paramount power may prevent the common 
instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from 
being used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce” 
even though “intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may thereby be 
controlled.”543  Any other conclusion would contradict the principle of 
federal supremacy.544 
The Court reiterated this conclusion after the war in Railroad 
Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad,545 in which it held 
that “[e]ffective control of [interstate traffic] must embrace some control 
over [intrastate traffic] in view of the blending of both in actual operation.  
The same rails and the same cars carry both.  The same men conduct them.  
Commerce is a unit and does not regard state lines . . . .”546  When interstate 
and intrastate commerce “are so mingled together that the supreme authority, 
 
537. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2006). 
538. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 14, § 3.2.3–.5, at 216–18 (noting that states wanted federal 
authority to be sharply limited). 
539. 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
540. Id. at 351. 
541. Id. 
542. Id. at 351–52. 
543. Id. at 353. 
544. Accord Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).  This case held: 
[T]he full control by Congress of the subjects committed to its regulation is not to be 
denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations [and that] 
the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is 
not limited by the act that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven 
therewith that the effective government of the former incidentally controls the latter. 
Id. at 399. 
545. 257 U.S. 563 (1922). 
546. Id. at 588. 
2013] The Wires Go to War 1047 
 
 
the Nation, cannot exercise complete effective control over interstate 
commerce without incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, such 
incidental regulation is not an invasion of state authority or a violation of the 
proviso.”547  The Supremacy Clause gives the federal government the power 
to “impose any reasonable condition on a State’s use of interstate carriers for 
intrastate commerce it deems necessary or desirable.”548 
Had the Court applied these same principles to telephony, it would have 
found that interstate and intrastate phone calls were just as intertwined as rail 
traffic and upheld federal jurisdiction over local rates.  And yet in Smith, the 
Court mandated that all property used for both interstate and intrastate calling 
be separated into interstate and intrastate portions, calling this separation 
“essential to the appropriate recognition of the competent governmental 
authority in each field of regulation.”549  The Court recognized that “the 
difficulty in making an exact apportionment of the property is apparent,” but 
nonetheless optimistically concluded that “reasonable measures” would be 
sufficient.550  As noted above, Congress codified this understanding by 
enacting section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which courts and 
commentators have recognized was specifically enacted to prevent the 
extension of Shreveport-type rules to telephony.551 
It is likely that the Post Office’s dismal record running the telephone 
system and its willingness to brush aside the interests of state regulators 
rendered policy makers less inclined to condone strong federal jurisdiction 
over telephony.  Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court’s Dakota Central 
decision upholding federal authority over local telephony was upheld as a 
war measure may have left the Justices feeling constrained to come to the 
opposite conclusion after the exigency had passed. 
D. The Limits of Government 
Perhaps the biggest question is that having taken over the telephone 
system, why did the government give it back?  Burleson openly harbored 
ambitions of making government ownership permanent, as did leaders in the 
U.S. military.552  Doing so would also have brought U.S. policy into 
conformity with the rest of the world. 
 
547. Id. 
548. Id. at 590. 
549. 282 U.S. 133, 148 (1930); accord id. at 149 (“The proper regulation of rates can be had 
only by maintaining the limits of state and federal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
550. Id. at 150; accord HUBER ET AL., supra note 14, § 3.3.3, at 223–24. 
551. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 372 (1986); Computer & Commc’ns Indus. 
Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 216 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1982); N.C. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 
793 n.6 (4th Cir. 1976); Matthew S. Bewig, Federalism and Telecommunications: On the Right 
Wavelength?, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1190, 1194–95 (1991); Richard McKenna, Preemption 
Under The Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 13–14 (1985). 
552. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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One challenge that government ownership struggles to surmount is the 
problem of raising risk capital.  Unlike private enterprises, which can issue 
equity, governments must finance any capital improvements through taxes, 
additional revenue from operations, or debt.553  Thus, because telephone 
systems in Europe were primarily developed by government actors, capital 
could not be raised by issuing equity to shareholders willing to assume 
entrepreneurial risk, and the systems faced political challenges that private 
enterprises did not need to confront.554 
In addition, government-owned enterprises tend to avoid risk rather than 
maximize economic welfare.  Government operators in Europe “used their 
market power to protect themselves from risk rather than to maximize 
profits.”555  These governments had invested heavily in telegraph systems, 
and the development of the telephone posed significant risks to telegraph 
revenues: “All the public agencies attempted to protect their telegraph 
services from telephone competition, even when they controlled both 
telegraph and telephone.”556  Even when European governments did not grant 
an exclusive monopoly to government agencies, these very same agencies 
“used similar tactics to those of private companies to extend their power.”557  
Without the threat of antitrust, there was nothing to restrain unfair practices 
on the part of the government agencies. 
In the United States, development was much more rapid owing to the 
competitive environment.  Competition encouraged innovation and 
experimentation.  For instance, “[t]he existence of several companies allowed 
various beliefs as to the elasticity of demand to be tested and prevented slow 
growth through a mistaken belief that the demand was inelastic.”558  But the 
pace and pattern of development in the United States was not merely 
influenced by the absence of government ownership, as discussed above.  
U.S. development was also influenced by the presence of state and local 
regulation, the possibility of antitrust enforcement, and the possibility of 
nationalization.559 
Each of these three factors influenced development of the U.S. network, 
such that it cannot be accurately said that the development of 
telecommunications in Europe and the United States diverged because of the 
presence of one factor, e.g., ideological or political.  It is more accurate to 
 
553. See Johannes M. Bauer, Regulation and State Ownership: Conflicts and 
Complementarities in EU Telecommunications, 76 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 151, 155 
(2005) (explaining that government-owned enterprises have fewer financing options than their 
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say that U.S. development at this time was influenced by the example of 
European regulation, and accordingly began to move towards a more similar 
result.560  In other words, there was a transatlantic dialogue about the proper 
way to develop a national telephone network. 
But perhaps the most important reason cited during the 1919 hearings 
on whether the government should return the telephone system to private 
control was the government’s inability to control costs.561  Both of these 
concerns should serve as cautionary tales to contemporary advocates of 
networks operated by governments.  Indeed, the government’s struggles to 
run the telephone network during World War I are part of a larger tradition 
identifying circumstances under which common carriage regulation is most 
likely to work well.  It is best suited to industries such as water and natural 
gas, in which technology is static, market shares are stable, and the fact that a 
network has already been built out reduces the emphasis on investment 
incentives. 
All of these considerations should give modern proponents of 
government ownership of telecommunications networks considerable pause.  
Indeed, the most salient examples appear to confirm these lessons.  On a 
more optimistic note, this episode also provides reassurance about how 
justifications based on national emergencies need not necessarily be 
enduring. 
Conclusion 
The brief, one-year government takeover of the U.S. telephone system 
during World War I is rarely analyzed at any length by commentators.  When 
it is discussed, it is often dismissed as an ad hoc event with few implications.  
A closer inspection of the history and dynamics of this episode in history 
yields a host of answers to a number of ongoing academic disputes.  It 
reveals that the reconsolidation of the telephone industry during the early 
twentieth century was the result of conscious government policy as well as 
the consequences of economic features of the market.  As such, it provides 
another example where government actors rather than corporate magnates 
were movers in curtailing competition.562 
The history also sheds new light on the origins of universal service, 
showing that it was the result of direct application of the ratemaking 
principles developed for the postal system.  In the process, it underscores the 
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legacy of rate averaging as a source of universal service funding that long 
antedates the more recent imposition of long distance–local cross subsidies. 
It illustrates how the invocation of emergency powers represents a two-
edged sword.  On the one hand, the exigencies of war make actions easier to 
justify.  On the other hand, courts that have upheld a governmental action on 
the basis of that exigency may later prove reluctant to uphold similar actions 
taken under more normal circumstances. 
Perhaps most importantly, the episode sheds new light on the 
circumstances under which governmental operation of a communications 
network is likely to succeed.  The experience suggests that such an 
arrangement works best when the technology is relatively stable, the risks are 
well defined, providing service does not require substantial new investments, 
and the political coalition supporting government operation has realistic 
expectations.  These insights can provide considerable guidance to policy 
makers considering reversing the trend toward privatization and returning to 
patterns of government ownership. 
